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MORAL DISARMAMENT: REVIVING A
LEGACY OF THE GREAT WAR
James D. Fry* & Saroj Nair**

I. Introduction
The first Nobel Peace Laureate, Frédéric Passy, criticized co-laureate
Henri Dunant and the Red Cross Movement when he wrote, “You do not
1
humanize war. You get rid of war by becoming more human.” Dunant’s
sharing of the prize with Passy came as a shock to peace activists throughout the world because Dunant was not involved in any peace movements,
2
and it was assumed that this prize was reserved for peace efforts. Peace activists saw Dunant’s work as completely unrelated to peace because the Red
Cross Movement and the resulting international humanitarian law did not
3
aim to prevent war. Indeed, the principle of humanity, which forms the
bedrock of international humanitarian law (“IHL”) and essentially all other
principles that fall under that umbrella, aims only at limiting superfluous in4
jury and unnecessary suffering during armed conflict, not at preventing
*
Associate Professor of Law and Director of the LL.M. Program, The University of
Hong Kong Faculty of Law.
**
PhD Candidate and Research Assistant, The University of Hong Kong Faculty of
Law.
The authors thank the participants of the 2017 “Human Dimensions and Perspectives in a
Nuclear World” Conference at the University of Manitoba Faculty of Law and the 2018 International Disarmament Law Conference at the University of Auckland Law School, where earlier versions of this Article were presented and where helpful feedback was received. This
Article is dedicated to the memory of the corresponding author’s grandfather Lester William
Fry, who served in the U.S. Army during the First World War.
1.
See IRWIN ABRAMS, THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE AND THE LAUREATES 41 (2001).
2.
Id.; Geir Lundestad, The Nobel Peace Prize, in THE NOBEL PRIZE: THE FIRST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS 163, 166, 168 (Agneta Wallin Levinovitz & Nils Ringertz eds., 2001);
DAVID P. FORSYTHE, THE HUMANITARIANS: THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED
CROSS 22–23 (2005); see also F.M. Carroll, Book Review, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 419, 420 (1988)
(reviewing BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF MODERN PEACE LEADERS (Harold Josephson ed.,
1985)) (listing Passy as one of commonly accepted peace leaders of the world but not listing
Dunant); James L. Tryon, The Rise of the Peace Movement, 20 YALE L.J. 358, 370–71 (1911)
(same).
3.
See ABRAMS, supra note 1, at 41.
4.
See Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land
art. 23, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247 [hereinafter 1899 Hague Regulations]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts pmbl., arts. 35–36, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3; Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 543 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998); see also EDWARD K. KWAKWA, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: PERSONAL AND MATERIAL FIELDS OF APPLICATION 34–38
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war. As commentators have observed, IHL—and its core principle of humanity—in a way perpetuates war by giving combatants greater hope of
surviving hostilities, thereby enabling recruitment and the following of or5
ders. All of this will come as somewhat of a shock to commentators who
6
essentially exalt Dunant for his contributions to global peace. To be clear,
this assertion is not the same as Pufendorf’s outright rejection of IHL for
being against the design of nature that only delays the return to natural
7
peace. Instead, this Article asserts that IHL and its principle of humanity
are not optimal bases for pressing for disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament. Some commentators, most notably Theodor Meron, push to humanize IHL by moving away from reciprocity of obligations toward absolute obligations on states in limiting suffering during times of armed
8
conflict. However, the majority view of the lex lata of IHL does not cur9
rently reflect this perspective. Passy’s quote against IHL and the principle
of humanity invite us to consider whether we must look at war and disarmament from a much broader human context if we eventually are to make
significant progress.
A survey of recent nuclear disarmament law scholarship indicates that
reliance on IHL and its core principle of humanity has gained considerable
(1992); Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public
Conscience, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 78, 84 (2000); Ryan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of
Armed Conflict, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 101, 127–28 (2010).
5.
See, e.g., Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A
Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 49, 56–58 (1994); FRITS
KALSHOVEN & LIESBETH ZEGVELD, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR: AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 203–04 (3rd ed. 2001);
FIONA TERRY, CONDEMNED TO REPEAT? THE PARADOX OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION 23–26
(2002).
6.
See, e.g., Morris Davis, The United States and International Humanitarian Law:
Building It Up, Then Tearing It Down, 39 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 983, 991–92 (2014);
JEAN PICTET, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE RED CROSS 18 (1979); André Durand, The
Development of the Idea of Peace in the Thinking of Henry Dunant, 26 INT’L REV. RED
CROSS 16 (1986); C.G. WEERAMANTRY, UNIVERSALISING INTERNATIONAL LAW 407 (2004)
(listing Dunant as a famous peace worker).
7.
See Christopher C. Joyner, International Law in the 21st Century: Rules for Global
Governance 16–17 (2005) (referencing and analyzing Pufendorf’s various books on this subject, including Samuel Pufendorf, Elementorum Jurisprudentiae Universalis Libri Duo [Two
Books on the Elements of Universal Jurisprudence] (1672), translated in Classics of International Law (James Brown Scott ed., William Abbot Oldfather trans., 1931) and Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo [Eight Books on the Law of Nature and Nations] (1688), translated in Classics of International Law (James Brown Scott ed. C.H.
Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., 1934).
8.
See THEODOR MERON, THE HUMANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9–15
(2006).
9.
See generally BRYAN PEELER, THE PERSISTENCE OF RECIPROCITY: GENEVA
CONVENTION III AND THE WAR ON TERROR (forthcoming 2019); Sean Watts, Reciprocity and
the Law of War, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 365 (2009); James D. Morrow, How Does Reciprocity
Work? Evidence from the Laws of War (unpublished manuscript) (2005), https://
www.law.berkeley.edu/files/spring05_Morrow.pdf.
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10

support. Not surprisingly, nuclear disarmament advocacy has followed in
the same path, usually under the banner of the humanitarian impact move11
ment. Some have criticized this movement for diluting the debates over
how the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (the “NPT”) regime should
evolve. Particularly, no one involved in the movement can agree on the next
step: some say that they should work toward banning nuclear weapons,
some desire increased efforts to close the gaps in the NPT, and others assert
that the NPT is not the proper framework for getting rid of nuclear weap12
ons.
Notwithstanding this and other criticism, the International Campaign to
Abolish Nuclear Weapons (the “ICAN”) won the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize
for emphasizing the negative humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons—the
13
basis of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Given the
fundamental disconnect between peace and the IHL principle of humanity,
and given how the International Court of Justice (the “ICJ”) determined in
its 1996 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion
that it “does not have sufficient elements to enable it to conclude with cer-

10.
See, e.g., DANIEL RIETIKER, HUMANIZATION OF ARMS CONTROL: PAVING THE
WAY FOR A WORLD FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (2018); Jonathan Granoff, Pacta Sunt
Servanda: Nuclear Weapons and Global Secure Sustainable Development, 21 SW. J. INT’L L.
311, 323–25 (2015); Hiroaki Nakanishi, Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: How Can
the World Resolve the Disharmony Between the UNSC and the UNGA?, 43 VICT. U.
WELLINGTON L. REV. 617, 630–38 (2012); Charles J. Moxley Jr. et al., Nuclear Weapons and
Compliance with International Humanitarian Law and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 595, 612–14, 637–69 (2011).
11.
This movement also has been referred to on the basis of humanitarian imperative,
humanitarian consequences and humanitarian action. See, e.g., Thomas E. Doyle II, Moral
and Political Necessities for Nuclear Disarmament: An Applied Ethical Analysis, STRATEGIC
STUD. Q., Summer 2015, at 19 (citing, inter alia, ARIELLE DENIS, BANNING NUCLEAR
WEAPONS: AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE (2014)); David A. Koplow, You’re Gonna Need a Bigger Boat: Alternatives to the UN Security Council for Enforcing Nuclear Disarmament and
Human Rights, 29 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 135, 158–61 (2016) (citing, inter alia, NICK RITCHIE,
INT’L LAW & POLICY INST. & UN INSTIT. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, THE
HUMANITARIAN INITIATIVE IN 2015 (2015)); Granoff, supra note 10, at 311, 315–16 (2015)
(citing, inter alia, THE HOLY SEE, NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: TIME FOR ABOLITION 5 (2014);
Report from the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons (2013), http://
www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/oslo-2013/HINWreport.pdf; J. Adele Buckley, An Arctic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone: Circumpolar NonNuclear Weapons States Must Originate Negotiations, 22 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 167, 173–
75 (2013); Moxley et al., supra note 10, at 683–86; Charles J. Moxley Jr., Obama’s Nuclear
Posture Review: An Ambitious Program for Nuclear Arms Control but a Retreat from the Objective of Nuclear Disarmament, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 734, 737–39 (2011). This Article
uses these terms interchangeably.
12.
See, e.g., Lewis Dunn, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Process: Looking Back to 2015, Looking Forward to 2020, Paper Presented at the Vienna Center
for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (Apr. 8, 2016) (notes on file with the author).
13.
See Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons pmbl., ¶¶ 2–3, 8–11, 24, July 7,
2017, UN Doc. A/Conf.229/2017/8; see also Press Release, Nobel Prize, The Nobel Peace
Prize 2017 (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2017/press-release/.
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tainty that the use of nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with
the principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict [or IHL and the
14
principle of humanity] in any circumstance,” one is left to wonder whether
there might not be a better path to peace through nuclear disarmament. In
extending Passy’s idea to nuclear disarmament, this Article resurrects from
the period following the First World War—or the Great War, as some refer
to it—the human-centered principle of moral disarmament and explores its
usefulness as a “new” or additional foundation for peace through nuclear
disarmament. This focus on an important principle that flowed from the
Great War also represents a fitting way to commemorate the 100th anniversary of its official conclusion.
As a brief disclaimer, the reader might see the word “moral” in the
phrase “moral disarmament” and expect analysis relating to ethical obliga15
tions to disarm based on the principal sense of the word. However, this Article’s use of “moral” goes beyond this meaning to include a focus on disarmament through society’s development, both economically and from a
human dimension. This Article seeks to use the term “moral” as it was construed during the interwar period, especially at the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments (the “Disarmament Conference”).
This definition of “moral” exists as the tertiary sense in the dictionary and
means “[d]esignating the incidental effect of an action or event . . . in producing confidence or discouragement . . . .” and is juxtaposed with “materi16
al,” as in “material disarmament.” This Article’s advocacy of a shift to a
broad, human-centered approach to disarmament resembles the develop17
ment of the notion of human security in the mid-1990s, with its focus on
the security of citizens in their daily activities, instead of just focusing on

14.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
Rep. 226, ¶95 (July 8); accord Timothy McCormack, From Solferino to Sarajevo: A Continuing Role for International Humanitarian Law?, 21 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 621, 633–34
(1997); see also Malcolm N. Shaw, Nuclear Weapons and International Law, in NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 9 (Istvan Pogany ed., 1987); Burns H. Weston, Nuclear Weapons and the World Court: Ambiguity’s Consensus, 7 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 371, 383–92 (1997) (analyzing the ambiguity embedded in the Court’s decision on
this point, thereby lending support to both sides of the argument).
15.
See, e.g. Moral, Oxford English Dictionary (Online), http://www.oed.com/view/
Entry/122086 (last visited Nov. 26, 2018) (listing “ethical” as part of the main definition);
THOMAS E. DOYLE, II, THE ETHICS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DISSEMINATION: MORAL
DILEMMAS OF ASPIRATION, AVOIDANCE, AND PREVENTION (2015); Mary Eileen E. McGrath,
Nuclear Weapons: The Crisis of Conscience, 107 MIL. L. REV. 191 (1985) (looking at nuclear
weapons from a religious perspective); Jonathan Granoff, Nuclear Weapons, Ethics, Morals,
and Law, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1413 (2000) (discussing the ethical obligation of states to disarm
themselves of nuclear weapons).
16.
Moral, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, definition 3(d), http://www.oed.com/view/
Entry/122086 (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
17.
See, e.g., Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security (Sean M.
Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller eds., 1995); Common Security in Asia: New Concepts in Human Security (Tatsuro Matsumae & Lincoln C. Chen eds., 1995).
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state security as had been customary in international security studies before
18
that point in time. Just as the 1994 United Nations (“UN”) Human Development Report identified new elements that were relevant to understanding
human security—such as economic, environmental, personal, community,
19
health, political, and food —this Article advocates an equally broad approach to disarmament, which the 1932 Disarmament Conference did when
initially introducing the principle of moral disarmament. At the core of this
idea is the belief that genuine societal stability, through promotion of aspects like economic growth, is needed to realize long-lasting disarmament.
This Article is divided into six parts, including this introduction and a
conclusion. Part II outlines the history that shaped the disarmament efforts
leading up to the 1932 Disarmament Conference, when the principle of
moral disarmament was first introduced and debated. This Part focuses on
the 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations; the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (or 1925 Geneva Protocol); the 1928
General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy
(or Kellogg-Briand Pact); and the 1929 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field (or
1929 Geneva Convention) as they relate to the notion of moral disarmament. Part III analyzes in detail how the 1932 Disarmament Conference itself nurtured but ultimately scuttled the notion of moral disarmament. This
Part focuses on the documents of the Preparatory Commission for the 1932
Disarmament Conference and the documents of the 1932 Disarmament
Conference itself to understand how they envisioned moral disarmament
and its accompanying principles and institutions. Part IV analyzes the potential relationship between development and disarmament in an effort to
identify the value in adopting the principle of moral disarmament. Finally,
Part V applies the principle of moral disarmament to contemporary discussions regarding nuclear disarmament. Focusing on moral disarmament adds
significant value to the discourse by tying disarmament to development:
economic and human improvement help rid societies of the insecurity that
typically drives states toward arms—even nuclear arms—in the first place.

18.
See, e.g., Nicholas Thomas & William T. Tow, The Utility of Human Security: Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention, 33 SECURITY DIALOGUE 177 (2002); Jessica T.
Mathews, Power Shift, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 1997, at 50. Likewise, this shift resembles the
shift of a few international law commentators in defining “humanity” outside the IHL context
as being “the legal principle that human rights, interests, needs, and security must be respected
and promoted.” Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and ȍRI6RYHUHLJQW\, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 513,
513 (2009). But see Anne Peters, Introduction to Symposium on Global Animal Law, 111
ASIL UNBOUND 252, 256 (2017) (appearing to adopt a more traditional IHL-based definition
of “humanity” that relates to superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering). Ostensibly nobody within the disarmament law discourse uses this broader definition of “humanity,” which
gives uniqueness and value to this Article’s thesis.
19.
See generally U.N. Dev. Programme, Human Development Report 1994, at 22–40
(1994).
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In short, this Article examines the concept of moral disarmament using
a broad-spectrum definition of humanity rather than the traditional IHL perspective. Rather than referring to human rights that are impacted by armaments, this Article looks at methods through which human initiative can
create a society that truly hungers for disarmament. In other words, this Article points out that the extent of change that society can bring about
through education, intellectual cooperation, peace initiatives, international
affairs awareness, and intercultural communication can be reflected in the
economic growth, social growth, and development of states. The aim is to
help the reader envisage a world where moral disarmament is part of the
fabric of society, thus helping to create an environment where people begin
to see disarmament as a way of life or a natural result of the peace and prosperity that they otherwise enjoy.

II. Moral Disarmament in Historical Context
A. Overview
The world today can well be viewed through the legacies bequeathed
from the greatest conflicts mankind has known in the twentieth century. One
such legacy is the League of Nations, which drew its first breath in the immediate aftermath of the First World War. The Covenant of the League of
Nations required all States to reduce their arms “to the lowest point con20
sistent with national safety.” Various agreements were discussed and
brought to the negotiating table in the interwar period, but one of the more
noteworthy agreements was the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, which sought to
21
abolish the use of force in international relations. It was also a pre-cursor
22
to the 1932 Disarmament Conference. The 1932 Disarmament Conference
was the first global conference that brought states to the negotiating table to
23
discuss “a universal reduction and limitation of all types of armaments.”
The participating states were asked beforehand—pursuant to Article 8 of the
1919 Covenant of the League of Nations—to abstain from any increases in

20.
See League of Nations Covenant art. 8.
21.
See generally General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National
Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact]; Joseph Preston Baratta, The Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Outlawry of War, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT 695 (Richard Dean Burns ed., 1993); Harold Josephson, Outlawing War: Internationalism and the Pact of Paris, 3 DIPLOMATIC HIST.
377 (1979).
22.
See Jill M. Sheldon, Nuclear Weapons and the Laws of War: Does Customary International Law Prohibit the Use of Nuclear Weapons in All Circumstances, 20 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 181, 222–23 (1996).
23.
See JOZEF GOLDBLAT, ARMS CONTROL: THE NEW GUIDE TO NEGOTIATIONS AND
AGREEMENTS 24 (2d ed. 2002).
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24

their armaments for a period of one year. This was later extended for an25
other four months.
One of the issues that the Disarmament Conference’s commissions and
committees examined in great detail was the principle of moral disarma26
ment. It is noteworthy that moral disarmament was brought up with the intention of creating an environment conducive to peace in international relations. There already was agreement among the negotiating states that a
reduction of defense expenditures and a limitation of arms was the immediate priority, as expressed in Article 8(4) of the 1919 Covenant of the League
of Nations:
The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private
enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant
upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to
the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able
to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for
27
their safety.
Through this provision, the international community hoped to avoid war in
the future by limiting arms trafficking, which were seen as directly connect28
ed. However, the idea that arms trafficking directly was connected to war
was not a novel concept. In the period following the First World War, there
already existed the notion that a reduction of armaments would lead to the
development of a peaceful society. In fact, in the late nineteenth century,
Russia urged other European states to reduce military expenditures and instead focus on building the global economy or otherwise promoting the bet29
terment of people’s lives. During the interwar period, the international
community tried to impress upon a more universal audience this nexus between disarmament and development.
In the run up to and during the 1932 Disarmament Conference, many in
the international community sought to link the concept of moral disarmament to “education, cooperation among intellectuals, the press, broadcast24.
See Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Report by the
Spanish Representative Adopted by the Council on September 30th, 1931, League of Nations
Doc. C.639(1).1931.IX (1931), http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/le000018.pdf;
see also GOLDBLAT, supra note 23, at 24 (mentioning this source).
25.
See Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Armaments Truce
(Renewal), at 1, League of Nations Doc. Conf.D.144 (1932), http://digital.library.
northwestern.edu/league/le000019.pdf; see also GOLDBLAT, supra note 23, at 24 (mentioning
this source).
26.
See also GOLDBLAT, supra note 23, at 25–28.
27.
See League of Nations Covenant art. 8, ¶ 4.
28.
See David G. Anderson, The International Arms Trade: Regulating Conventional
Arms Transfers in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, 7 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 749, 759–60
(1992).
29.
See GOLDBLAT, supra note 23, at 19.
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30

ing, theatre and cinema.” The Conference’s Committee on Moral Disarmament (the “Committee”) adopted a text stating that, “parties should undertake to ensure that education at every stage should be so conceived as to
inspire mutual respect between peoples and emphasize their interdependence. . . . [P]arties would ensure that persons entrusted with education and
31
preparing textbooks were inspired by these principles[.]” The text also
called for using public broadcasting—through channels like the cinema—to
32
promote feelings of peace and friendship between states. In short, the text
required states to avoid any program that could disrupt friendly relations between states or incite disharmony in international relations, all in the name
of disarmament.
To further realize disarmament, the Committee considered a proposal to
change municipal laws in such a way as to develop friendly international
33
relations. It proposed the introduction of legislation that enabled “punish34
ment for certain acts detrimental to good relations among states.” The
Committee also recommended that the “parties should pledge themselves to
consider introducing into their state constitutions an article prohibiting resort to force as an instrument of national policy, embodying thereby the
35
principles of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact.” Thus, it can be appreciated
that, in the interwar period, there was a movement trying to nudge states to
submerse themselves holistically into the moral disarmament principle.
There was conscious optimism that, as society assimilated and inculcated
values of mutual respect, interdependence, the spirit of goodwill and peace
among nations, and the benefits of development and economic growth, there
would be a conscious disavowal of the call to arms, conflicts, and any element that would otherwise disrupt peace among nations. It is this humancentered approach to disarmament that this Article aims to understand and
resurrect. In doing so, this Part aims to understand the context leading up to
these proposals.

B. Disarmament Movements Prior to the First World War
Prior to the First World War, states were already focusing on disarmament. Kant’s 1797 essay Perpetual Peace was the first peace theory cover36
ing the actions of states. In a break from established norms, Victor Hugo
and Giuseppe Garibaldi advocated peace as social justice and human rights

30.
Id. at 27–28.
31.
Id. at 27.
32.
Id. at 27–28.
33.
Id. at 28.
34.
Id.
35.
Id.
36.
POLITICAL AND CIVIC LEADERSHIP: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 174 (Richard A.
Couto ed., 2010).

Fall 2018]

Moral Disarmament

9
37

rather than faith and religious virtue as it had been until then. The first
38
peace societies were established in the 1800s. The American Peace Society
was founded in 1828, and it focused on resolving international conflicts
through reason and negotiation by promoting international dispute resolu39
tion through arbitration. The early peace movements also denounced the
allocation of national human and economic resources toward war and the
40
military, and they strongly criticized military spending. The first peace
congress in Brussels in 1848 attracted participants from Belgium, France,
Great Britain, Spain, and the United States. It was there that the first calls
41
for disarmament were made. In 1849, almost 1,000 official delegates attended the Paris Peace Conference, where the first call for a European union
42
based on a democratic principle was made. In 1867, Geneva hosted the
largest peace congress at the time, until the Paris exposition of 1889 went on
43
to spawn the first universal peace congress.
This first century of peace-building culminated in the Hague Peace
44
Conferences of 1899 and 1907. The 1899 conference did not result in a
45
significant decrease in arms, and the 1907 conference resulted in a “feeble” resolution calling on the participating states to acknowledge and delib46
erate on the critical agenda of disarmament and arms control. Nonetheless,

37.
See id. at 175.
38.
Id. at 174.
39.
Id.; see also DAVID CORTRIGHT, PEACE: A HISTORY OF MOVEMENTS AND IDEAS
28 (2008).
40.
See CORTRIGHT, supra note 39, at 28; POLITICAL AND CIVIC LEADERSHIP: A
REFERENCE HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 174.
41.
See POLITICAL AND CIVIC LEADERSHIP: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK, supra note 36,
at 175. However, what appears to have been overlooked by most commentators is that Chinese feudal states during the Chun Chiu period (72–481 B.C.) held a multilateral disarmament
conference in 546 B.C., over two millennia before any of these conferences, where they tried
to remove arms and eliminate war. See generally RICHARD LOUIS WALKER, THE MULTISTATE SYSTEM OF ANCIENT CHINA 54–58 (1953); A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 5 (Trevor N. Dupuy & Gay M. Hammerman eds., 1973); Evan
Morgan, A League of Nations in Ancient China, 57 J. NORTH CHINA BRANCH ROYAL ASIATIC
SOC’Y 50 (1926).
42.
See POLITICAL AND CIVIC LEADERSHIP: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK, supra note 36,
at 175.
43.
See id. at 175–76.
44.
Id. at 176.
45.
See Detlev F. Vagts, The Hague Conventions and Arms Control, 94 AM. J. INT’L L.
31, 34 (2000); Geoffrey Best, Peace Conferences and the Century of Total War: The 1899
Hague Conference and What Came After, 75 INT’L AFF. 619, 632 (1999); George H. Aldrich
& Christine M. Chinkin, A Century of Achievement and Unfinished Work, 94 AM. J. INT’L L.
90, 92 (2000).
46.
See Vagts, supra note 45, at 34.
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the Hague Conferences “opened the doors—just barely—to the era of arms
47
control.”

C. Disarmament After the First World War
It is not a stretch to say that the world was eager to disarm after the First
World War. The war-ravaged battlefields of the various theaters of the First
World War had front row seats to the most massive scale of destruction the
world had ever seen until then. They witnessed the changes surrounding traditional military strategy as the war drew to a close. The stage was set for
calls to disarm. Of course, as discussed above, there already was some discussion of disarmament prior to the First World War. But the aftermath of
the war was the catalyst for an environment open to global discussions and
negotiations regarding the pursuit of the lofty goal of disarmament. This
Section explores the disarmament debates after the First World War.
Post-World War I, disarmament efforts came to be perceived as vital to
the maintenance and continuance of world peace. The peaceful settlement of
disputes, security of states, and efforts to reduce or limit the level of armaments in states around the world came to be known as the holy triumvirate
48
of the disarmament efforts in the interwar period. Several attempts were
made to get states to agree to reduce their weaponry and in some cases even
49
abolish certain kinds of weapons. The following paragraphs provide a few
examples.
The League of Nations was responsible for many of the initiatives to
50
work toward peace in international relations. At the heart of the quest for
51
peace and economic stability was the conundrum of disarmament. The
First World War’s massive scale of destruction and its effect on economies
and people all over the world caused public opinion to skew firmly against
52
war and warmongering. Disarmament was the cynosure of all discussions
in the public domain in the immediate aftermath of the war. It is no coincidence that disarmament featured prominently on the agenda of the League
of Nations and carved its place into Article 8 of the Covenant of the League

47.
Id. at 31 (explaining how the costs of increasing armaments were taking a toll on
government budgets, and this was a primary reason for the Hague Conferences, but noting that
the outcomes of the Conference related to qualitative aspects rather than curtailment of arms
expenditure); see also Aldrich & Chinkin, supra note 45, at 90 (noting that one of the
achievements of the Conferences was the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes; Best, supra note 45, at 628 (same).
48.
See Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Verbatim Record
(Revised) of the First Plenary Meeting, at 4, League of Nations Doc. Conf. D./P.-V.1. (1)
(1932), http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/le000429.pdf.
49.
See id. at 5–6.
50.
See id. at 2.
51.
See id.
52.
See id. at 2, 7.
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of Nations. Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations states that,
“the maintenance of peace required the reduction of national armaments to
the lowest point consistent with (States’) national safety and the enforce54
ment by common action of their international obligations.” The Council of
the League of Nations set up a Permanent Advisory Commission to handle
55
disarmament as provided for under Article 8 of the Covenant.
The first seed of the concept of moral disarmament sprouted at the first
Assembly of the League, during which it was recognized that “disarmament
was more than a technical question, and that, for its practical solution it was
necessary to consider also a whole series of political, social and economic
56
problems.” The recognition that disarmament was not to be merely confined to material disarmament and the decision to widen the scope of enquiry and deliberations led to the creation of a Temporary Mixed Commis57
sion (the “TMC”). The TMC was composed of recognized authorities on
58
the various aspects of disarmament requiring consideration. It deliberated
59
for four years until the 1924 Assembly of the League. The discussions at
the TMC focused “upon the necessarily intimate relation between disarma60
ment and security.” There was a school of thought that believed that disarmament “could only be effected in proportion to the development of security” and another school of thought that firmly believed security for states
61
was to be garnered as a consequence of disarmament. Walking the middle
path between these two schools of thought, the TMC tried to bring about a
compromise and proposed the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance to the As62
sembly of the League in 1923.
The draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance was the precursor to the Paris
Pact for the Renunciation of War—also referred to as the Kellogg-Briand
Pact—as the former was based on the idea that “war, as an instrument of
63
aggression, must henceforth be regarded as an international crime.” The
draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance was not acceptable to the states as a final
and satisfactory solution of the problem and was dropped by the Assembly

53.
See id. at 2.
54.
League of Nations Covenant art. 8.
55.
Verbatim Record (Revised) of the First Plenary Meeting, supra note 48, at 2.
56.
See id. at 2.
57.
See id.
58.
See id.
59.
Id. at 3.
60.
Id.
61.
Id.
62.
See id.
63.
Id.; see also GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION
TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 517–19 (5th ed. 1976) (discussing the relationship between
these and other treaties); Mohammed M. Gomaa, The Definition of the Crime of Aggression
and the ICC Jurisdiction over that Crime, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND
THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 55, 62 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2004) (same).
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of the League in 1924, in lieu of “a more comprehensive plan, viz., the Ge64
neva Protocol of 192[5].” The 1925 Geneva Protocol overcame the difficulties posed by the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance and was accepted by
fourteen states. However, it did not manage to obtain general acceptance
because of “difficulties arising from the non-participation of important
65
countries which were not members of the League of Nations.” Therefore,
the Geneva Protocol was set aside in favor of a partial application of a regional system of guarantees, which came to be referred to as the Locarno
66
Agreements of October 16, 1925. It can be said that the Locarno Agreements also contributed to the idea of moral disarmament. The representatives of the eight signatory states were firmly convinced that
the entry into force of these treaties and conventions would contribute greatly to bring about a moral relaxation of international
tension, help powerfully towards the solution of many political and
economic problems in accordance with the interests and sentiments
of the peoples concerned and would thus effectively hasten the dis67
armament provided for in Article 8 of the Covenant of the League.
The General Act for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes—consisting of three
conventions dealing with conciliation, judicial settlement, and arbitral settlement—was presented to the Assembly of the League in 1928 and came
68
into effect on August 16, 1929. In 1930, the Assembly of the League
69
adopted the Convention on Financial Assistance. The next development in
promoting disarmament talks was that a majority of states of the League accepted the Permanent Court of International Justice’s compulsory jurisdic70
tion. The Committee on Arbitration and Security, which was set up by the
Preparatory Commission in accordance with a resolution adopted by the Assembly of the League at its 8th session in September 1927, proposed a
framework whereby “security provided in the General Act would be sup-

64.
Verbatim Record (Revised) of the First Plenary Meeting, supra note 48, at 3.
65.
Id. There is a similar problem currently facing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
and the Chemical Weapons Convention, where major states in these areas remain outside of
these regimes.
66.
See id.; see also Werner Morvay, Locarno Treaties (1925), in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 330 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1981).
67.
Verbatim Record (Revised) of the First Plenary Meeting, supra note 48, at 4.
68.
See id. (noting that the General Act was accepted by nineteen States and represents
one of the most considerable efforts in the task of peace building in the period after the First
World War); see also Quincy Wright, The General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 24 AM. J. INT’L L. 582, 582 (1930).
69.
See Verbatim Record (Revised) of the First Plenary Meeting, supra note 48, at 4–5
(noting that the enforcement of the Convention on Financial Assistance was conditional “on
the entry into force of a scheme for the reduction of armaments” and that was accepted by
thirty states).
70.
See id.
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plemented by a draft Convention to improve the Means of preventing War,”
71
which the Assembly adopted in 1931.
A brief mention must be made about the efforts regarding naval dis72
armament. The Washington Conferences of 1921 and 1922 resulted in a
Five-Power Treaty (United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Ja73
pan) that limited capital ships and aircraft carriers. A naval conference was
held in Geneva in 1927, but the deliberations did not lead to any successful
74
outcome. However, the London Naval Conference in 1930 was more successful and resulted in an agreement between the United States, the British
Commonwealth of Nations, and Japan “to dispose certain existing capital
ships . . . and limit their cruisers, destroyers and submarines to given defi75
nite figures.”
In parallel efforts to promote disarmament and peace, the most important advancement in the disarmament and security context outside the
realm of the League was “the adoption of the Paris Pact for the Renuncia76
tion of War as an Instrument of National Policy.” In order to harmonize
the Paris Pact with the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Assembly of
the League inserted into the Covenant a prohibition of war and an affirma77
tion that international disputes had to be resolved through pacific means.
Thus, disarmament efforts in the interwar period were clearly considered important by states that wished to work toward rebuilding economies
and establishing peace. It also is clear from the above that states made several efforts toward disarmament in the period after the First World War.

D. Preparation for the Disarmament Conference
In the aftermath of the First World War, the developments highlighted
above were slowly adding momentum and setting the stage for the Disarmament Conference. In the build-up to the Disarmament Conference, a
78
Preparatory Commission was set up to conduct massive deliberations, as
well as to lay the groundwork for the Conference, where the triple objectives inspiring League members’ efforts were arbitration, security, and dis79
armament. Guarantees of security and arbitration were considered im71.
Id.
72.
See id. at 5–6.
73.
See id. at 5.
74.
See id.
75.
Id.; see also L.P. Morgan, The Background of the London Naval Conference, with
Comparative Statistics on the Five Navies Illustrated by Tables and Charts (1930).
76.
Verbatim Record (Revised) of the First Plenary Meeting, supra note 48, at 5.
77.
See id. (the Assembly of the League adopted, in 1927, a resolution “in favor of a
complete renunciation of war”).
78.
See id. at 4 (stating that the “bulk of the work of the Preparatory Commission was
of a technical character” and also included questions related to “security and provision of pacific settlement of disputes”).
79.
See id.
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portant factors to negotiate a fixed level of armaments in accordance with
80
the terms of Article 8 of the Covenant of the League. The Preparatory
Commission sessions built up expectations that, as states started to
acknowledge the growth of security in international relations, the agreement
81
to decrease arms would increase. The Preparatory Commission constituted
two special sub-commissions for the study of the questions relating to disarmament—one for deliberations regarding the military, naval, and air as82
pects and the other related to the non-military aspects.
The Preparatory Commission deliberated for five years and prepared a
draft of the Convention for the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments in
83
December 1930. The draft Convention prescribed a framework and meth84
ods to achieve disarmament. There was no provision regarding moral disarmament in the draft Convention of the Preparatory Commission. The Preparatory Commission finished its work in December 1930, and the League
85
of Nations started preparing for the Disarmament Conference. In the runup to the Disarmament Conference, the Assembly of the League appealed to
all the states to spare no effort to “create a world opinion strong enough to
86
enable [the] Conference to achieve positive results.” An armaments truce
was recommended with the object of “preventing competition in armaments
87
pending the conclusion” of the Disarmament Conference. The Armaments
Truce was “accepted for one year from November 1st, 1931,” by the gov-

80.
See Report by the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, at 32,
League of Nations Doc. C.690.M.289.1930.IX.[(C.P.D.295(I)] (1930), http://
digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/le00030a.pdf.
81.
See id. at 34; see also Records of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitations
of Armaments, League of Nations (1932) (showing that the Preparatory Commission held six
sessions, two in 1926, two in 1927, one in 1928, and the sixth session began in April 1929,
was suspended in May 1929, resumed in November 1930 and continued until December
1930).
82.
See Report by the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, supra
note 80, at 32.
83.
See Verbatim Record (Revised) of the First Plenary Meeting of the Conference,
supra note 48, at 5.
84.
See id. at 5–6 (noting how some of the questions dealt with in the draft Convention
were the “limitation of effectives in time of peace and the limitation of the period of service in
conscript armies, the indirect limitation of land material by means of a limitation of expenditure, the direct limitation of tonnage and gun caliber of naval material, the limitation of expenditure on material for naval armaments, the limitation of the total number, horse power and
volume of dirigibles, the limitation of the total number and horse power of aeroplanes, the
limitation of the total annual expenditure on land, sea and air armed forces and formations
organized on a military basis, publicity and exchange of information, the prohibition of the
use of chemical and bacteriological arms, the creation of a permanent disarmament commission, and finally the procedure to be followed in dealing with complaints.”).
85.
See id. at 6.
86.
Id.
87.
Id.
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ernments taking part in the Disarmament Conference.” The Armaments
89
Truce was later renewed for a period of four months. The Armaments
Truce and its renewal bear witness to the sincere intentions of the governments to deliberate and arrive at a mutually beneficial reduction of world
90
armaments. The detailed deliberations of the Preparatory Commission thus
paved the way for comprehensive negotiations and discussions at the Disarmament Conference.

E. Immediately Before the Disarmament Conference
At the threshold of the Disarmament Conference, the “two great safeguards against acts of violence and war” were the Covenant of the League
91
of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The Disarmament Conference
was convened “to deal with the whole problem of the reduction and limitation of armaments under Article 8 of the Covenant of the League” and to
92
deliberate on definite steps toward achieving and maintaining peace. The
Disarmament Conference was considered unique because states who were
not members of the League of Nations also were to participate in the im93
portant quest to reduce the world’s armaments. This stands in contrast with
current practice within the International Atomic Energy Agency (the
“IAEA”), for example, where non-member states can attend and participate
in IAEA conferences only if they are UN members or members of a UN

88.
Id.
89.
See Armaments Truce (Renewal), supra note 25.
90.
The Albanian government accepted the Armaments Truce and stated its desire “of
seeing the ideals of peace and justice on which the Covenant is based firmly established
throughout the world and of helping to prepare the ground for the success of the coming Conference.” See Conference for the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments, Armaments Truce,
at 6, League of Nations Doc. C919.M.484.1931.IX.[Conf.D.35.]. The German government
expressed its willingness to support “all measures which might facilitate the work of the Disarmament Conference” in its acceptance of the Armaments Truce. Id. at 7. The Australian
government stated in its acceptance of the Armaments Truce that it was convinced that “the
success of the Disarmament Conference would be greatly promoted” by the armaments truce.
Id. The Bulgarian government confirmed its acceptance of the renewal of the Armaments
Truce stating expressly that it was prepared “to adhere to any measure likely to bring about
the effective reduction of the armaments of all States.” Id. The Lithuanian government set out
its conviction that the truce would “greatly contribute to the success of the General Disarmament Conference[.]” Id. at 14.
91.
See Verbatim Record (Revised) of the First Plenary Meeting, supra note 48, at 1.
92.
Id. at 7 (stating that the agenda for the Disarmament Conference could be divided
into three tasks: “(a) to arrive at a collective agreement on an effective programme of practical
proposals speedily to secure a substantial reduction and limitation of all national armaments;
(b) to determine that no armaments may be maintained outside the scope of that treaty by
which all nations represented (at the Conference) are to make the achievement of universal
disarmament their common aim; (c) to ensure continuity of advance towards our ultimate
goal, without detracting in any way from the fullest measure of success of our immediate effort, by planning the holding of similar conferences at reasonably short intervals of time”).
93.
Id. at 1.
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94

specialized agency. Sixty states were represented at the Disarmament Conference, which was called “the most important international gathering since
95
the termination of the world war in 1918.”
Thus, there were many developments related to disarmament in the period after the First World War leading up to the Disarmament Conference.
The majority of the discussions centered around the principles of security,
arbitration, and material disarmament. There was, however, a parallel
movement of thought regarding another feature of disarmament—that of
moral disarmament. Throughout the interwar period, the concept of moral
disarmament was discussed in circles of intellectual cooperation. It was also
taken up by certain interested states who wished to broaden the perspective
of the deliberators at various fora of discussion relating to disarmament.
While material disarmament was a finite concept, easy to understand and
easy to convert into numerical figures—even if not as easy to achieve—
moral disarmament was, as a concept, intangible and therefore more difficult to elucidate. The next Part looks at all instances and references to moral
disarmament as developed during the interwar period.

III. Moral Disarmament in the 1932 Disarmament Conference
During the deliberations at the Disarmament Conference, the principle
of moral disarmament quickly generated considerable international support.
Various documents and records of discussions during and leading up to the
1932 Disarmament Conference reveal that the Polish delegation was an active contributor to the agenda of moral disarmament. Other champions of
the cause of moral disarmament include the International Organization on
Intellectual Cooperation, the International Committee on Intellectual Coop96
eration, and various National Committees on Intellectual Cooperation.
Moreover, at various occasions in 1931, delegates of the French, British,
97
and Spanish governments made statements regarding moral disarmament.
Moral disarmament also found expression in international associations like
the International Federation of League of Nations Societies and the World

94.
See Paul C. Szasz, The Law and Practices of the International Atomic Energy
Agency 128–29 (1970) (citing Procedural Rule 30).
95.
Verbatim Record (Revised) of the First Plenary Meeting, supra note 48, at 1.
96.
See Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Moral Disarmament: Documentary Material Forwarded by the International Organisation on Intellectual Cooperation, at 6–8, League of Nations Doc. Conf. D. 98 (1932), http://
digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/le000079.pdf.
97.
See Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government, at 1, League
of Nations Doc. C.602.M.240.1931.IX [Conf. D.I6] (1931), http://digital.library.northwestern.
edu/league/le000080.pdf. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to moral disarmament at “the tenth session of the League Assembly . . . .” Id. The British Foreign Minister
made a similar reference at “the annual meeting of the Burge Memorial Trust . . . .” Id. (internal quotations omitted). The Spanish delegation made references to moral disarmament at “the
twelfth session of the Assembly . . . .” Id.
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Peace League. The International Federation of the League of Nations Societies, at its fifteenth plenary Congress, voiced its consideration that any
progress in moral disarmament would proceed from the rejection of “bellicose or aggressive propaganda.” It adopted a resolution seeking to develop
practices in the sphere of journalism and the Press to reinforce commitment
99
to the values of moral disarmament.
The Disarmament Committee of the Women’s International Organizations considered that “moral hostility,” above all, “was a grave menace” to
world peace and lent the moral disarmament movement their full support,
100
having worked for several years to achieve its principles. Another contribution to the growing awareness of moral disarmament came from the Uni101
versal Peace Congress in July 1931. The Universal Peace Congress maintained that moral disarmament was crucial in achieving material
disarmament, as moral disarmament was “at the same time the condition
102
and the guarantee of all reduction of military armaments.” A much-valued
contribution came from an appeal made by the Conference of Press Experts,
which was aimed at the network of press and journalists around the world
and sought collaboration and contributions from the press in its efforts to103
ward peace, harmony, and goodwill among states and their peoples. The
following paragraphs describe the various initiatives taken with regard to
moral disarmament and also integrate the efforts made in the fields of intellectual cooperation that are pertinent to disarmament. Scrutiny of the deliberations made by the Committee for Moral Disarmament draws attention to
the various indicators that were considered important for achieving moral
disarmament. The framework discussed by the Committee for achieving
moral disarmament and the support professed by various states in this regard are described in detail in this Section.

A. The Polish Initiative on Moral Disarmament
The Polish delegation contributed to the principle of moral disarmament
through statements at the last session of the Preparatory Commission for the
Disarmament Conference, discussions in the Special Committee appointed

98.
Id.
99.
Id. at 4.
100.
See Communication on “Moral Disarmament” by the Disarmament Committee of
the Women’s International Organisations to the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation
of Armaments, at 1, League of Nations Doc. 7A/36301/31255 (1932), http://
libraryresources.unog.ch/ld.php?content_id=19934112.
101.
See Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government, supra note
97, at 4.
102.
Id.
103.
Id. at 5 (noting that the Conference of Press Experts adopted a resolution on Moral
Disarmament wherein it appealed to “the Press of the world to contribute by every means at
its disposal to the consolidation of peace, to combat hatred between nationalities and between
classes,” as these factors posed the greatest danger to international peace).
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to deliberate on and prepare a draft General Convention “for strengthening
the [m]eans of preventing [w]ar,” and detailed memoranda on the subject of
104
moral disarmament. This Section discusses three documents—the Polish
memorandum of September 1931, the proposals of February 1932, and the
proposals of March 15, 1932—that highlight the contributions of the Polish
105
delegation to achieving moral disarmament.
The Polish memorandum of September 1931 set out suggestions to
achieve moral disarmament in various spheres of government and civil
106
life. Moral disarmament was not a principle that could be put into practice
and display results immediately; rather, it was a process that would give desirable results on a progressive inculcation of its values as it slowly but
firmly, and even unconsciously, permeated into every aspect of public life.
Moral disarmament could be put into practice in governmental spheres of
public works, international relations, and domestic legislation, and in public
spheres of education, broadcasting, press, cinema, and other intellectual co107
operation activities. Some of the recommendations in the memorandum
related to national legislation, problems of the press, systemic changes in
108
education, and broadcasting.
The proposals of February 1932 elaborated on suggestions of the memorandum in an effort to facilitate “achieving of moral disarmament in every
109
field of public life controlled by the organs of government.” These efforts
were driven by the firm conviction that harmony in international relations
would inspire and cultivate mutual confidence and respect among states and
their peoples. This, in turn, would be a step toward maintaining peace and
110
thus a gradual attainment of disarmament. As a result, it was vital to convert governments to the cause of moral disarmament and to use a top-down
approach to integrate aspects of moral disarmament into their foreign poli111
cies and international relationships. The contribution of governments to

104.
Id. at 1.
105.
See id.; see also Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Proposals of the Polish Delegation with Regard to the Gradual Attainment of Moral Disarmament, League of Nations Doc. Conf.D.76 (1932), http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/
league/le000107.pdf; Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Preliminary Report of the Work of the Conference, at 143, League of Nations Doc. Conf.D.171(I)
(1936), http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/le00089a.pdf.
106.
See Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government, supra note
97, at 2–3.
107.
Id. (emphasizing that “one of the ways to achieve a progressive realization of disarmament was through a practical achievement of moral disarmament” in various spheres like
education, press, broadcasting and cinema, and legislation).
108.
Id. at 2, 3, 5.
109.
See id. at 1.
110.
See id.
111.
Id. at 2.
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112

this cause was crucial. If international relations between governments did
not encompass qualities of mutual respect, tolerance, and peaceful resolution of disputes, inter alia, then it would be improbable—if not impossible—to expect the principles of moral disarmament to seep into various fea113
tures of public life.
The Polish proposals of March 15, 1932 on moral disarmament made
114
recommendations in respect of legislation, press, and broadcasting. They
sought to stretch domestic law to certain actions that would be considered
“incompatible with satisfactory international relations and dangerous to the
115
peace of the world.” Suggestions were put forward for the gradual
116
achievement of moral disarmament through channels of the press and
117
through broadcasting. The importance of the contribution of the Polish
delegation in the field of moral disarmament is evident from the discussion
in the following sections. The suggestions put forward by the Polish delegation also find parallels in the deliberations of the International Organization
on Intellectual Cooperation.

B. Intellectual Cooperation and Moral Disarmament
In the immediate aftermath of the First World War, the League of Nations considered it important to promote intellectual activities and to seek
cooperation with regard to various fields comprising intellectual activity,
with the goal of promoting international cooperation and international intel-

112.
See Communication on “Moral Disarmament” by the Disarmament Committee of
the Women’s International Organisations to the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation
of Armaments, supra note 100, at 1 (beseeching all governments to “take necessary steps to
guard the school, the book, the press, the radio, the cinema, and all public platforms, from
pernicious influences working against peace”).
113.
See Preliminary Report of the Work of the Conference, supra note 105, at 143 (stating that the “International Policy of Governments should be in harmony with their efforts in
the direction of moral disarmament”); Proposals of the Polish Delegation with Regard to the
Gradual Attainment of Moral Disarmament, supra note 105, at 2.
114.
See Preliminary Report of the Work of the Conference, supra note 105, at 143.
115.
See id. at 143 (noting that a suggestion was made to conclude an international convention where “Governments would agree to make certain specified actions punishable offences under their law, such actions to be defined as incompatible with satisfactory international relations and dangerous to the peace of the world. These actions would include inciting
public opinion to warlike sentiments, propaganda which aimed at inducing States to violate
international law, and the deliberate spreading of false or distorted reports or forged documents likely to embitter the relations between States.”).
116.
See id. at 143 (noting that a recommendation was made that “[a] conference should
be held . . . of qualified representatives of journalists and publishers’ associations to consider
what steps could be taken to put the idea of moral disarmament into effect so far as the Press
was concerned.”).
117.
Id. at 143 (noting that a recommendation was made to have a General Convention
on broadcasting, and it was suggested that governments “undertake[] to adhere to the principle
of moral disarmament in their supervision of broadcasting programmes.”).
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118

lectual collaboration. The result was the International Organization on In119
tellectual Cooperation, which was one of the League of Nations’ four
120
technical entities. The purpose of intellectual collaboration and cooperation was to create “an atmosphere favourable to the pacific solution of inter121
national problems.” Intellectual cooperation was seen as a definite method
of encouraging participation and collaboration between states “in all fields
of intellectual effort” in order “to promote a spirit of international under122
standing as a means to the preservation of peace.” These principles were
also the basis of the concept of moral disarmament. The International Organization on Intellectual Cooperation made several valuable contributions
to the field of moral disarmament, especially in the fields of education, international collaboration, international relations, broadcasting, cinema, and
123
the press. The intellectual cooperation movement found many common
factors with the agenda of the Polish delegation in the field of moral disarmament and these commonalities were discussed by the Committee for
Moral Disarmament.

C. The Committee for Moral Disarmament
The methods of achieving moral disarmament were deliberated on by
delegations at the Disarmament Conference and in parallel by the International Organization on Intellectual Cooperation and other associations. The
delegations at the Disarmament Conference were convinced of the necessity
of carefully examining all proposals regarding moral disarmament and to
pursue a method of transforming the theory into practice. To achieve these
ends, a Committee for Moral Disarmament came into being on March 15,
1932 at the meeting of the Political Commission of the Disarmament Con124
ference. The memoranda submitted by the Polish Government to the Po118.
See Moral Disarmament: Documentary Material Forwarded by the International
Organisation on Intellectual Co-operation, supra note 96, at 5–6.
119.
See id. at 6 (noting that the International Organization on Intellectual Co-operation
was created in 1926 and consists of an International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation,
three permanent institutions, viz., an Intellectual Co-operation Section in the League Secretariat, an International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation at Paris and an International Educational Cinematographic Institute in Rome, thirty-nine national committees, and a large number
of committees of experts).
120.
See id. at 5.
121.
Id. at 6 (italicized in original).
122.
Id. (italicized in original).
123.
See id. at 7 (noting that, due to the large interconnected network of the Intellectual
Co-operation Organization, “[i]deas of interest to contemporary civili[z]ation or which tend to
promote international collaboration in instruction and education may thus pass in a short space
of time from a national proposal to an international reality[,]” and in addition, “rapid cooperation of various countries with the League of Nations is ensured . . . .”).
124.
See Report of the Committee for Moral Disarmament at the End of the First Session
of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, at 1, League of Nations
Doc. Conf.D.138.[Conf. D./C.D.M.24.] (1932), http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/
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litical Commission of the Disarmament Conference played an important
125
role in the establishment of the Committee for Moral Disarmament. The
memoranda drew the attention of the Commission to the obvious connection
126
between material and moral disarmament.
A sub-committee was appointed to examine the various factors that
connected material and moral disarmament and to prepare an agenda for de127
liberation by the Committee for Moral Disarmament. The agenda for the
work of the Committee for Moral Disarmament was prepared in accordance
with the recommendations made by the Committee on Intellectual Coopera128
tion, and suggestions were put forward by certain delegations. The agenda
of the Committee for Moral Disarmament categorized the various aspects
linking material and moral disarmament into three headings:
x
x
x

Questions concerning intellectual cooperation and technical
means of spreading information, including the problems of education, utilization of cinematography, and broadcasting;
Questions concerning the cooperation of the Press; and
129
Questions of a legal character.

Sub-committees were appointed to deliberate on the various aspects related
130
to each of the above headings. The Committee for Moral Disarmament
adopted a resolution on June 2, 1933, stating that provisions regarding moral disarmament “should stand on the same footing as provisions regarding
131
material disarmament in the final texts to be adopted by the Conference.”
The Committee for Moral Disarmament went on to adopt a draft text prepared by the International Organization on Intellectual Cooperation as a basis for discussion of the first group of “questions concerning intellectual cooperation and technical means of spreading information, including the prob-

le000078.pdf (noting that the Committee had M. Perrier (Switzerland) as President and M.
Szumlakowski (Poland) as Rapporteur).
125.
See id. at 1 (noting that the Polish memorandum and proposals were created on
September 23, 1931, February 13, 1932, and March 15, 1932).
126.
See id.
127.
See id.
128.
See id.
129.
See id.
130.
See id. at 2 (noting that the sub-committee for questions concerning intellectual cooperation based its deliberations on data, suggestions and recommendations from “the Organi[z]ation on Intellectual Co-operation and the Rome International Educational Cinematographic Institute, and . . . several delegations.”); Preliminary Report of the Work of the Conference, supra note 105, at 144 (noting that the Committee appointed a Legal Committee to
study the legal and constitutional questions involved in the problem of moral disarmament and
a memorandum submitted on the subject by M. Pella (Romania)).
131.
See Letter Addressed to the President of the Conference by the Chairman of the
Moral Disarmament Committee December 1, 1933, at 932, League of Nations Doc. Conf.D/
C.D.M.38 (1932), http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/le00032e.pdf.
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lems of education, utilization of the cinematography and broadcasting.”
133
The text had four articles and a short preamble. The draft text considered
issues relating to the “education of the younger generation, co-operation of
the intellectual world, utilization of technical means of spreading information, and ways and means of giving effect to possible undertakings.” It
also sought to provide a framework that would facilitate moral disarmament
134
in all discussed areas.
135
The Committee for Moral Disarmament forwarded this text to the
136
President of the Conference on December 1, 1933. At the same time, the
Chairman of the Committee for Moral Disarmament informed the President
of the Conference that the questions related to legislation and cooperation of
the press would be considered by the Committee at a later stage of the Con137
ference. The Chairman also communicated that the Committee would
keep on hold the procedures arrived at for the implementation of moral disarmament until the Conference arrived at procedures to execute the imple138
mentation of material disarmament. The United Kingdom and a few other
132.
See Report on the Work of the Committee for Moral Disarmament, at 928, League
of Nations Doc. D./C.D.M.37 (1933), http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/
le00032e.pdf (showing how three texts were at the disposal of the Committee for deliberations
regarding the first group of questions, including questions related to teaching, co-operation
between intellectual circles, broadcasting, theatre and the cinematograph; noting that one was
a draft framed by the Rapporteur of the Committee in June 1932, one was the draft submitted
by the International Committee on Intellectual Co-operation and the third draft was one submitted to the Committee by the British and United States delegations; showing that ideas
emerged from a comparison of the texts led the French delegation to present a compromise
draft, which was finally adopted as a basis for discussion; noting how the Assembly of the
League of Nations at its fourteenth session “stressed the value of the draft text relating to
Moral Disarmament which had been framed by the International Committee on Intellectual
Co-operation.”).
133.
See Preliminary Report of the Work of the Conference, supra note 105, at 144.
134.
See Report of the Committee for Moral Disarmament at the End of the First Session
of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, supra note 124, at 2.
135.
See Preliminary Report of the Work of the Conference, supra note 105, at 144
(pointing out that the draft was submitted with reservations, with one reservation being submitted by the Hungarian delegation but it concerned the form and not the content of the text,
with the reservation being stated in the Minutes of the nineteenth meeting held on November
17, 1933); Report on the Work of the Committee for Moral Disarmament, supra note 132, at
928.
136.
See Preliminary Report of the Work of the Conference, supra note 105, at 144
(showing that the text had been “revised by the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation in July 1933, and further amended by the Committee on Moral Disarmament in October and November 1933.”); Report on the Work of the Committee for Moral Disarmament,
supra note 132, at 928 (showing that the task of drafting a new text was entrusted to a Drafting Committee consisting of the Chairman of the Committee for Moral Disarmament and M.
Komarnicki, Rapporteur, inter alia).
137.
See Preliminary Report of the Work of the Conference, supra note 105, at 145.
138.
See Letter Addressed to the President of the Conference by the Chairman of the
Moral Disarmament Committee Dated December 1, 1933, supra note 131, at 932 (showing
that the Committee had agreed on procedures of implementation of moral disarmament for the
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delegations voted in favor of the draft text, but stated that they might later
wish to present further observations with regard to the substance or form of
139
the new draft. In view of such observations, the delegates pointed out that
the text was not finally binding and reserved the right to consult their na140
tional administrations. Even though the draft was not considered to be
binding, a framework to incorporate principles of moral disarmament in
everyday life took distinct shape through the deliberations of the Committee
for Moral Disarmament. The Committee also deliberated on methods to
achieve moral disarmament in various spheres of public life, discussed in
the next Section.

D. Achieving Moral Disarmament
The various proposals and the draft text adopted by the Committee for
Moral Disarmament reveal that the spheres most conducive to the achievement of moral disarmament were education, intellectual collaboration, legislation, press, broadcasting, and cinema. Each of these spheres is examined
in detail in the following sub-Sections.

1. Education and Moral Disarmament
Education has far-reaching consequences that impact many genera141
tions. There is no better way to plant the seeds of peace, brotherhood,
non-violence, harmonious existence, and tolerance than in the fertile minds
142
of young people through a nurturing system of education. As such, it was
proposed to achieve moral disarmament through educational reform. It was
important to protect the young from hostile inclinations toward foreign
143
states and their peoples. The entire framework of education had to be assessed to ensure that the principles of moral disarmament would be fol144
lowed in every aspect of educating the public. Recommendations were
made with respect to every aspect of the educational system, including curricula, syllabi, school textbooks, teacher training, university courses, and

first group of questions and that such procedures would include “the question of periodic reports on the progress of the work of moral disarmament, methods of addressing complaints
and action to be taken concerning them, and the organ to be set up for the receipt and publication of reports and complaints.”).
139.
See Report on the Work of the Committee for Moral Disarmament, supra note 132,
at 928.
140.
See id.
141.
See Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government, supra note
97, at 3.
142.
See id. at 3.
143.
See id.
144.
See id. (noting that the Polish delegation made a few recommendations on the subject of education and that the sub-committee of experts of the International Committee of Intellectual Co-operation also provided recommendations on the subject of education).
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145

civil service examination subjects. Recommendations made in respect of
each of these aspects are discussed in detail below.

a. Teacher Training
It was considered equally, if not more, important to ensure that the attitudes of teachers reflected the principles of moral disarmament in every as146
pect of their interactions with their students. Educational institutions were
seen as the place where young and impressionable minds would internalize
the principles they were taught. This made the students vulnerable to indoctrination if their teachers expressed negative attitudes regarding foreign
147
states or people. Such negative impressions had to be avoided if moral
disarmament was to have any chance of influencing the minds of students.
Therefore, it was considered crucial to create suitable training programs for
teachers and educators to adopt the attitudes needed to pass on the principles
of moral disarmament to their students.

b. Instruction in Matters of the League
The importance of cultivating a broad, international perspective among
the young was regarded as conducive to creating an awareness that “interna148
tional co-operation was the normal method of conducting world affairs.”
It is pertinent to mention that the Assembly of the League made recommendations to its member states “to arrange for the youth in their countries to be
149
made aware of the aims of the league.” To further this international per-

145.
See Moral Disarmament: Correspondence with Dr. James T. Shotwell, League of
Nations Doc. 7A/652/652 (1933), https://libraryresources.unog.ch/ld.php?content_id=
31291829 (regarding Moral Disarmament) (noting how the proposal regarding examinations
for government positions was adopted from the American proposal regarding education and
intellectual co-operation); Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government,
supra note 97.
146.
See Moral Disarmament: Correspondence with Dr. James T. Shotwell, supra note
145.
147.
See id.
148.
Moral Disarmament: Documentary Material Forwarded by the International Organisation on Intellectual Co-operation, supra note 96, at 7 (noting how the International Organization on Intellectual Co-operation pointed out that in 1923 the Assembly of the League of
Nations “considered the question of training the younger generation to regard international cooperation as the normal method of conducting world affairs”).
149.
Id. at 8 (noting how an experts sub-committee was included in the International
Committee of Intellectual Co-operation and how recommendations were made regarding instruction of youth in matters of the League, including the “introduction of compulsory instruction in regard to the League, elimination of content prejudicial to mutual understanding between nations, from school text-books, educational measures to enable young people to
acquire a better understanding of foreign nations and to instill in them the ideals of international co-operation,” with the Committee also referring to the work undertaken by “the Conference of Institutions for the Scientific Study of International Relations in connection with
the Sub-Committee of Experts for instruction in the aims of the League”).
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spective, recommendations were made to install “compulsory instruction in
all schools in regard to the work and aims of the League of Nations and
150
matters of development of international co-operation.” In addition, there
was a proposal to install “special League of Nations chairs in faculties of
151
law.” It was considered necessary to implement such measures on an international basis. A recommendation was made to bind governments under
an international convention to curtail “elements of hatred” and negativity in
international relations and to create awareness of the ideas of the League of
152
Nations in all manifestations of school instruction. Creating awareness
about the League of Nations and its principles and framework regarding international relations and peace was seen as a stepping-stone for young peo153
ple to internalize principles of peace, understanding, and tolerance. In order to further such awareness, reformers proposed establishing a
“documentation section” dealing with the League and aspects of interna154
tional relations in all the “different national [education] centres.”

c. Revision of School Textbooks
The International Organization on Intellectual Cooperation considered
that a significant positive step toward the realization of moral disarmament
could be taken by revising school textbooks with regard to all material that
was “capable of arousing hatred of foreigners,” their communities, and any
material that would go against the development of international peace and
155
mutual respect. Such revision would be conducive to the maintenance of
156
mutual respect, tolerance, and international peace and harmony. In the
process of reviewing the textbooks for revision of material that could cause
ill-will, reformers also encouraged states to consider improving the content
157
of school textbooks. Such improvements would include revision of content injurious to peaceful international relations and mutual understanding,
150.
See Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government, supra note
97, at 3 (noting how it was recommended that the educational system “be equipped to provide
such training at all stages of school life” and how a proposal to create suitable documentary
material to “help train teachers and through them to impart the principles to the students” was
suggested).
151.
Id.
152.
Id.
153.
See id.
154.
Moral Disarmament: Documentary Material Forwarded by the International Organisation on Intellectual Co-operation, supra note 96, at 9 (noting how this was a collaboration
between “Musées pédagogiques (collections of teaching material) and directors of primary
education . . . .”).
155.
Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government, supra note 97, at
3; see also Moral Disarmament: Documentary Material Forwarded by the International Organisation on Intellectual Co-operation, supra note 96, at 8.
156.
See Moral Disarmament: Documentary Material Forwarded by the International
Organisation on Intellectual Co-operation, supra note 96, at 2–3, 9.
157.
See id. at 3.
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methods “to reconcile historical truth with goodwill towards foreign nations[,]” presentation of the truth without causing ill-will toward another
state, and relating the history of one state with reference to the international
158
context.

d. Intellectual Collaboration and International Relations
The International Organization on Intellectual Cooperation recommended strengthening intellectual cooperation between various societies of
159
intellectual activity in its efforts to bring about moral disarmament. International relations in the aftermath of the First World War dealt with problems of a “political, economic, legal, social and historical nature created by
160
the war . . . .” These problems gave rise to a need for new methods of in161
struction to provide guidance in navigating them. In the period following
the First World War, “many new chairs were founded in Universities, new
study centres, both national and international, and centres of instruction and
research were set up in nearly every country[,]” and there was a common
162
focus on the study of “international affairs . . . .”
The International Organization on Intellectual Cooperation was successful in achieving an interactive collaboration between distinguished centers of academic excellence through the establishment of an annual confer163
ence starting in 1928. This collaboration was an excellent example of
cultivating intellectual networks for circulating the principle of moral dis164
armament among academics from all over the world. The annual conference was very successful, and one of the outcomes was a large interconnected network for “the exchange of information, publications and
165
bibliograph[ies] . . . .” The network enabled a continuous flow of information between educational centers in different countries, thus “facilitating
the task of professors and students and establishing intercourse between na166
tional institutions hitherto unacquainted with each other.” The conference
also contributed to moral disarmament by engaging in scientific research
167
and discussions on contemporary issues of international relations.
158.
Id. at 9.
159.
See id.
160.
Id. at 10.
161.
Id.
162.
Id.
163.
See id. (noting how the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, in March
1928, convened a conference for the purpose of assisting with collaboration of the academic
work of the “most distinguished representatives of national centres for advanced international
studies” in Berlin).
164.
See id. at 10–11.
165.
Id. at 10.
166.
Id.
167.
See id. at 11 (noting an observation at the conference convened by the International
Institute of Intellectual Co-operation that this “new (scientific and not political) method of
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Again, all of this was done in the name of disarmament. These conferences also highlighted the Organization’s willingness to walk the path of
moral disarmament by engaging with the public and explaining “the different national points of view in regard to the problems raised by the Confer168
ence for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments . . . .” Other recommendations related to pursuing moral disarmament through cultivation of
international intellectual collaborations included affiliations between stu169
dents and teachers of different countries, an organization of international
school exhibitions, an exchange system for international books and bibliog170
raphies, and continuous international collaboration in primary and secondary school education through exchange of information, gramophone
171
records, films, foreign visits, and study scholarships in foreign countries.
Suggestions made in respect of furthering the principle of moral disarmament were not in vain, as can be seen from the efforts taken by states to
implement and put the recommendations into practice. In working toward
moral disarmament, states placed particular emphasis on education during
the interwar period. In particular, some of the implementation efforts included: (a) setting up an educational information center for coordination of
172
the work, publication of biannual educational surveys, and publication
173
and translation of a book on the League for teachers and educators, (b) introducing instruction regarding the League’s aims and ideals into primary
174
and secondary schools’ curricula, (c) institution of lectures and electives
in international relations and government publication of manuals relating to
175
the League and international relations, (d) revision of school textbooks in
study and discussion on the international plane, based on documentation of a national character, systematically collected and arranged” could prove to be very relevant to the work of
achieving moral disarmament).
168.
Id. at 11.
169.
See Proposals of the Polish Delegation with Regard to the Gradual Attainment of
Moral Disarmament, supra note 105, at 2 (suggesting that affiliations between students and
teachers of different countries would definitely contribute toward the ideal that international
peace is the only pathway to the future).
170.
See Moral Disarmament: Documentary Material Forwarded by the International
Organisation on Intellectual Co-operation, supra note 96, at 9 (noting how a service for “the
exchange of works and bibliographies concerning international questions and books describing the life and characteristics of the different nations” also was proposed).
171.
See id. at 4.
172.
Id. at 8.
173.
See id. (noting that a book on the “aims and organization of the League, specifically
intended for members of the teaching profession, was also prepared. This publication has been
translated into twenty-four languages, partly with the help of grants from the League, and
about 250.000 copies have been printed.”).
174.
Id. (noting that as a result of the recommendations of the sub-committee, thirtythree states took steps “to introduce instruction in regard to the League into the curricula of
primary and secondary schools.”).
175.
Id. (noting how twenty-three governments dealt with “the recommendations of the
Sub-Committee of Experts in ministerial notes or special communications in their official
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176

line with contemporary ideas of international affairs, (e) programs for the
177
exchange of school children and teachers, (f) national conferences of
178
179
teachers, and (g) revision of textbooks through the adoption of the Cas180
ares resolution.
The American Committees on Intellectual Cooperation also made efforts to instill an awareness of the principles of moral disarmament through
the educational system in America. The adoption of the American Declaration on Moral Disarmament by the American Council on Education was
considered a “turning point in the policies of the Department of Educa181
tion.” Another success was influencing the curriculum of all schools holistically in the United States by “substitute[ing] for its Year Book for 1934
182
the subject of Moral Disarmament, (or better, International Civics).” As
can be gauged from this discussion, education was considered to be one of
the important influencers for the dissemination of the principle of moral disarmament. Every avenue was explored, from school curriculum to training
of teachers, as well as methods to achieve intellectual collaboration and cooperation. Apart from education, questions of a legal character were also
discussed widely in connection with the principle of moral disarmament, as
explained in the following sub-Section.

journals and have encouraged the publication of special manuals and works dealing with the
League and international co-operation.”).
176.
Id. (noting how nineteen governments took “active steps to promote the revision of
school text-books in order to adapt them to modern ideas on international relations.”).
177.
Id. (noting how fourteen states had directly encouraged the interchange of school
children and teachers).
178.
Id. (noting how three governments had “convened national conferences of teachers
with a view to adopting the recommendations of the Sub-Committee of Experts to the special
needs of their country.”).
179.
Id. at 9 (describing how the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation conducted various studies on this aspect and published a report containing several recommendations regarding “revision of school text-books; methods of teaching history and of editing
text-books; how to reconcile historical truth with goodwill towards foreign nations; the part
that can be played by teachers and professors and by public administrations[,]” with the report
going on to be “a basis for the work of a Committee of Experts . . . includ[ing] the representatives of the Teaching Commission of the International Committee on Historical Science, educationalists, institutes for the scientific study of international relations and the Sub-Committee
of Experts for the Instruction of Youth in the Aims of the League.”).
180.
Id. (noting how the Casares resolution was adopted with regard to revision of
school textbooks in 1925).
181.
Moral Disarmament: Correspondence with Dr. James T. Shotwell, supra note 145
(regarding Moral Disarmament) (explaining that at a meeting of the National Education Association at Minneapolis in March 1933 the Department of Superintendents of Education, “a
very reactionary body, nationalist to the core, and yet, on hearing the declaration for Moral
Disarmament, it, for the first time, not only accepted it but passed a unanimous resolution in
favor of it,” which was a turning point in the policies of the Department of Education).
182.
Id. at 2.

Fall 2018]

Moral Disarmament

29

2. Legislation and Moral Disarmament
The Committee on Moral Disarmament considered the principle of
183
moral disarmament from a “juridical and constitutional” point of view. It
considered legislative change an important factor in the attainment of moral
disarmament. The Committee also believed that states should adopt the international perspective in their domestic legislation, especially while con184
sidering the maintenance of harmony in international relations. Domestic
legislation should reflect the de-legitimization of war and aggression from
185
the Kellogg-Briand Pact. A consequence of such legislation would be to
introduce criminalization of actions promoting war and aggression. Actions
intended to incite international hatred and undermine, in any manner whatsoever, the relationship of mutual trust and harmony between states would
fall under the purview of such legislation and constitute punishable offens186
es.
These recommendations were not merely theoretical. States around the
world already implemented similar provisions into their domestic legisla187
188
tion. Examples were provided from the draft penal codes of Brazil, Ro-

183.
Report of the Committee for Moral Disarmament at the End of the First session of
the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, supra note 124, at 2; Preliminary Report of the Work of the Conference, supra note 105, at 144.
184.
See Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government, supra note
97, at 2.
185.
See Preliminary Report of the Work of the Conference, supra note 105, at 145 (proposing that “the contracting parties should undertake, when reviewing their constitutions, favourably to consider the introduction of articles forbidding any resort to force as an instrument
of national policy, thus embodying the principles of the Pact of Paris as an integral part of the
positive law of the State”); Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government,
supra note 97, at 2.
186.
See Proposals of the Polish Delegation with Regard to the Gradual Attainment of
Moral Disarmament, supra note 105, at 1 (including actions that were linked to creating disharmony in international relationships, like warmongering, inciting of hatred against foreign
people or States); Preliminary Report of the Work of the Conference, supra note 105, at 144,
145 (listing the acts to be covered by this legislation as including “the preparation and execution in the territory of a [s]tate of measures directed against the safety of a foreign [p]ower,
efforts to induce a state to commit certain specified acts in violation of its international obligations, the aiding or abetting of armed bands formed in the territory of a [s]tate and invading
the territory of another[s]tate, the dissemination of false information likely to disturb international relations or the false attribution to a foreign [s]tate of actions likely to bring it into public contempt or hatred”); Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government,
supra note 97, at 2.
187.
See Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government, supra note
97, at 2 (noting how these recommendations on penal legislation also were discussed at the
First International Conference for the Unification of Criminal Law in 1927).
188.
Id. (explaining that the Brazilian penal code contains a provision that punishes persons who “stir[] up popular agitation with a view to exerting pressure on the Government in
favour of war whilst diplomatic negotiations are in progress with a foreign country . . . .”).
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190

mania, and Poland. One of the recommendations made by the Polish
delegation targeted organizations “whose aims appear to be legal,” but are
observed to be involved with activities dangerous to peace and security. It
was suggested that penalties applicable to organizations with illegal aims
191
ought to be extended to organizations hiding behind a legal veil. This
would, in effect, counter anti-peace movements or measures calculated to
incite disharmony. It was further recommended that, after reviewing the deliberations relating to reforming national legislation, delegates could consider the possibility of an international convention for legislation that
192
“would give impetus to the principle of moral disarmament.” The legal
aspect of moral disarmament was just as important as the educational aspect. If education could shape the path of moral disarmament in the future,
legislation would ensure that principles of moral disarmament are effective
in the relations between states and in their internal affairs as well. However,
the task of communicating the principles of moral disarmament to the widest audience possible would fall on the media and broadcasting outlets, as
explained in the following sub-Section.

3. Cinema, Broadcasting, and Moral Disarmament
If education was a method to inject the principles of moral disarmament
into the thinking of young people and future generations, broadcasting was
the avenue through which the principles of moral disarmament could influence multitudes of people. The cinema and the radio were channels that
could easily influence public opinion and thus could prove to be excellent
carriers of moral disarmament principles. Broadcasting also could be used
for educational purposes by disseminating the principles of moral disarma193
ment. Recommendations with regard to broadcasting included drawing up

189.
See Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Survey of Proposals Made by Various Delegations During the General Discussion, at 20–21, League of
Nations Doc. Conf.D.99 (1932) (noting how “R[o]mania was the first country to introduce in
her Draft Penal Code the offence of war propaganda” and how Romania intends to bring her
internal law into line with the new international law, thus taking a step toward the achievement of the principle of moral disarmament).
190.
See Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government, supra note
97, at 2 (noting how the penal codes of Brazil, Romania and Poland contained a provision
“that any person guilty of incitement to war shall be punished with imprisonment”).
191.
Id. at 2.
192.
Proposals of the Polish Delegation with Regard to the Gradual Attainment of Moral Disarmament, supra note 105, at 1; Survey of Proposals Made by Various Delegations
During the General Discussion, supra note 189, at 20–21 (noting how the Romanian delegation suggested that “international conventions should be concluded for the universal prevention and punishment of war propaganda and all individual acts likely to disturb international
relations.”).
193.
See Moral Disarmament: Documentary Material Forwarded by the International
Organisation on Intellectual Co-operation, supra note 96, at 3, 9 (noting how the Committee
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a general convention on broadcasting following the principles of moral disarmament, suggestions for governments to apply principles of moral disarmament in all interactions with broadcasters and broadcasting stations, using censorship to restrict content in cinema that was likely to cause hatred
194
and ill-will between states and incite warmongering, and incentivizing the
creation of content that would spread messages of peace, harmony, mutual
195
respect, and tolerance in international relations.
In addition, suggestions were made to produce a series of educational
films that would be useful to educators in promoting the work of moral disarmament, drawing content from the League and its aims regarding world
peace and harmony. The films would be devoted to cultures and heritages of
various states, which would demonstrate “the economic, political and cul196
tural interdependence of the nations.” Broadcasting would also be used to
provide “objective accounts of international problems and a variety of talks
197
to promote knowledge of foreign nations.”
An extract from a 1931 agreement between Polish and German broadcasting companies was used as an example of achieving moral disarmament
through broadcasting. Clauses of interest in this regard included a right of
one party to carry on a certain amount of positive propaganda with respect
to its domestic activities while ensuring that the subject matter would not
offend the national sentiment of the audience of the other party. Another example from this agreement of the use of broadcasting to foster goodwill between two states—and thus disseminate the principles of moral disarmament—was an undertaking to ensure that the subject of any broadcast would
198
not undermine the goodwill and understanding between the states. Cinema
and broadcasting were great channels to immerse people from various
spheres of life in the spirit of moral disarmament. It was hoped that even
lighthearted entertainment would leave a lasting impression. Finally, the
press could introduce an introspective aspect to the development of moral
disarmament, which would invite public discussion and engagement in this
arena.

on Intellectual Co-operation sought an enquiry into “the educational aspects of broadcasting,”
with questions related to “the use of wireless [broadcasting]” being included in the enquiry).
194.
See id. at 3 (explaining how the League’s Institute of Educational Cinematography
in Rome dealt with aspects of “[c]inematographic activities of an international character”).
195.
See Proposals of the Polish Delegation with Regard to the Gradual Attainment of
Moral Disarmament, supra note 105, at 2.
196.
Moral Disarmament: Documentary Material Forwarded by the International Organisation on Intellectual Co-operation, supra note 96, at 9.
197.
Id. at 3.
198.
See Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government, supra note
97, at 4.
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4. The Press and Moral Disarmament
The press is—or rather should be—the gatekeeper of the flow of public
199
opinion on domestic and international events. If the principles of moral
disarmament could be included in all press activities, then moral disarmament eventually could be embedded in public opinion through fairness and
200
reasonableness while reporting, inter alia. Issues relating to moral disarmament and the press were discussed at a press conference at Geneva in
201
1927.
The main issue was that, while the press could be counted on to disseminate messages of peace and harmony, certain sections of the press, through
irresponsible reporting or other factors, could also create waves of panic,
202
repression, disharmony, and hatred through their channels of broadcast.
Therefore, it was important to get the full support of the International Asso203
ciations of Journalists in order to find a solution for the issue of the press.
Furthermore, the issue of the press was delicate; any suggestions would
204
have to be offered with caution so as not to hinder freedom of speech.
Punishing an author whose reports have, for example, created anti-peace
demonstrations or security implications would amount to placing restrictions on the freedom of the press. Instead, it was recommended that authors be given a chance to correct the wrong information, including “extending the application of the right of reply (rectification) so as to include
205
foreign Governments.” The establishment of an international disciplinary
tribunal for journalists was also suggested as a way to deal with journalists
206
“charged with pursuing activities dangerous to peace.” An interesting
suggestion in this regard was to enlist the assistance of the press, at a conference of the press, to help develop a framework “capable of safeguarding
207
international interests without compromising the freedom of the Press.”
Despite these perceived dangers with the press, those at the Conference
believed that the press could be channeled to work as a strong facilitator of
moral disarmament by choosing to always exercise “a positive pacific influ-

199.
See generally C. Edwin Baker, The Media that Citizens Need, 147 U. PA. L. REV.
317 (1998); Jonathan M. Moses, Legal Spin Control: Ethics and Advocacy in the Court of
Public Opinion, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1811 (1995).
200.
See Proposals of the Polish Delegation with Regard to the Gradual Attainment of
Moral Disarmament, supra note 105, at 1.
201.
See Moral Disarmament: Memorandum from the Polish Government, supra note
97, at 5.
202.
See id. at 2–3, 5.
203.
See id. at 4–5.
204.
See id. at 3.
205.
Id. (explanatory parenthetical added).
206.
Id.
207.
Id.
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ence” and “refraining from envenoming disputes . . . .” An “immediate
improvement in international relations” and “the educative effect” of re209
sponsible channels of the press would be examples of such outcomes. The
International Organization on Intellectual Cooperation had several affiliations with international associations of journalists, and so it proposed to
work with the representatives of the press to involve the press in facilitating
210
the promotion of moral disarmament.
This Section shows that the proponents of moral disarmament saw education, intellectual cooperation, legislation, broadcasting, cinema, and the
press as the best channels to help with the progressive realization of moral
disarmament. The following Section explores the broader support for the
principle of moral disarmament once it was introduced through these channels.

E. Support for Moral Disarmament
Support for the principle of moral disarmament was immediate and active. Apart from the efforts of the International Organization on Intellectual
Cooperation and various National Committees of Intellectual Cooperation,
the delegates at the Disarmament Conference commended the call for moral
disarmament.
The Romanian delegate, in his speech during the general discussion,
stated that the proposals concerning moral disarmament had to be followed
to the letter, as “organi[z]ed moral disarmament is a primordial condition
211
for military disarmament . . . .” In this regard, action by parents, teachers,
governments, the press, religious organizations, and cinema was vital in
212
achieving moral disarmament. The delegate from Persia expressed his
wholehearted support for moral disarmament and urged the delegates at the

208.
Moral Disarmament: Documentary Material Forwarded by the International Organisation on Intellectual Co-operation, supra note 96, at 2 (noting how, with regard to questions
concerning co-operation of the Press, the sub-committee used a draft resolution proposed by
the Polish Government as a reference point for its discussions, and that representatives of international groups of journalists were given an opportunity to air their views and help the deliberations; noting how a preliminary statement on these matters was to be prepared and submitted to the Committee for Moral Disarmament); see also Report of the Committee for
Moral Disarmament at the End of the First Session of the Conference for the Reduction and
Limitation of Armaments, supra note 124, at 2.
209.
Moral Disarmament: Documentary Material Forwarded by the International Organisation on Intellectual Co-operation, supra note 96, at 2.
210.
See id. at 2.
211.
Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Verbatim Record (Revised) of the Twelfth Plenary Meeting, League of Nations Doc. Conf. D./P.V.12(1) (1932),
http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/le000440.pdf; see also Survey of Proposals
Made by Various Delegations During the General Discussion, supra note 189, at 20–21.
212.
Verbatim Record (Revised) of the Twelfth Plenary Meeting, supra note 211, at 3;
Survey of Proposals Made by Various Delegations During the General Discussion, supra note
189, at 20–21.
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Conference to use every method proposed to achieve moral disarmament.
The Spanish delegate referred to the importance of following the principles
of moral disarmament and emphasized that the “psychological” character of
214
moral disarmament was the key to achieving disarmament. The Canadian
delegate impressed upon the other delegates the importance of achieving
peace through preventing conflicts rather than imposition of sanctions, thus
highlighting the importance of moral disarmament in the work of disarma215
ment. The Belgian delegate stated that the provision of safeguards and
protection in the juridical organization of peace at an equivalent level of
216
armed defense was necessary to achieve disarmament. The Chinese delegate spoke about the benefit of abolishing “existing systems and measures”
that encouraged and fostered the spirit of aggression and warmongering
217
among peoples in order to promote disarmament. The Polish delegate
stressed the importance of creating “security and stability” in international
relations, which would be the cornerstone of disarmament, and that the first
218
step was moral disarmament. The delegate from Czechoslovakia made an
important point with regard to moral disarmament when he spoke of “permanently stable conditions” and “reconciliation” among the states that were
219
previously adversaries. He referred to “moral and psychological forces” of
moral disarmament as the only way to effect a reconciliation that would
220
contribute to lasting peace and solidarity. The Treaty of Friendship and
Compulsory Arbitration between Czechoslovakia and Austria in this regard
221
was mentioned as an illustrative example. The Panamanian delegation ex213.
Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armament, Verbatim Record (Revised) of the Eleventh Plenary Meeting, League of Nations Doc. Conf. D./P.V.11(1) (1932);
Survey of Proposals Made by Various Delegations During the General Discussion, supra note
189, at 19.
214.
Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Verbatim Record (Revised) of the Eighth Plenary Meeting, League of Nations Doc. Conf. D./P.V.8(1) (1932), http:/
/digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/le000436.pdf; Survey of Proposals Made by Various
Delegations During the General Discussion, supra note 189, at 21.
215.
See Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Verbatim Record
(Revised) of the Ninth Plenary Meeting, League of Nations Doc. Conf. D./P.V.9(1) (1932),
http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/le000437.pdf; Survey of Proposals Made by
Various Delegations During the General Discussion, supra note 189, at 15.
216.
Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Verbatim Record (Revised) of the Seventh Plenary Meeting, League of Nations Doc. Conf. D./P.V.7(1) (1932),
http://digital.library.northwestern.edu/league/le000435.pdf; Survey of Proposals Made by
Various Delegations During the General Discussion, supra note 189, at 14.
217.
See Survey of Proposals Made by Various Delegations During the General Discussion, supra note 189, at 50.
218.
Arbitration, Security and Reduction of Armaments: Extracts from the Debates of
the Fifth Assembly Including Those of the First and Third Committees, at 14–15, League of
Nation, Doc. C.708.1924.IX.(C.C.O.1) (1924) [hereinafter Extracts from the Debates].
219.
Id. at 31–32.
220.
Id. at 32.
221.
See id.
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pressed its support for the principles of moral disarmament and emphasized
222
that they were successfully used in Panama for a few decades. For example, after the Treaty of Hay-Bunau-Varilla, the Panamanian government decided not to maintain the expense of a standing army and used the funds to
223
develop education, infrastructure, and other public works.
In addition to the contribution of the Polish delegation and the International Organization on Intellectual Cooperation to the principle of moral
disarmament, the effusive vocal support professed by the other states lent
significant momentum to the moral disarmament movement. The following
Section explores the importance of moral disarmament in the broader debates happening at that time.

F. Importance of Moral Disarmament
In the interwar period, despite many deliberations and agreements on
material disarmament, there was a marked increase in the number of armaments rather than the expected decreases, which many saw as a disturbing
224
trend. This increase in armaments gave impetus to the moral disarmament
movement, which considered that it was important to simultaneously pursue
225
material and moral disarmament. One could not be considered more im226
portant than the other. In other words, material and moral disarmament
had to be regarded as two sides of the same coin. Nevertheless, it was believed that peace through the moral disarmament principle would be more
deeply rooted and create a more stable environment than “providing for
227
sanctions.” In the interwar period, it was important for states to cultivate
friendly relations with their adversaries in the past war in order for their
peoples to attempt a genuine reconciliation with each other and thus enable
228
mutual respect and confidence in their international relations. This was
seen as the only way that true stability could be built into the international
229
system.

222.
See id. at 35–36 (referring to the Treaty of Hay-Bunau Varilla and noting how after
the Treaty of Hay-Bunau Varilla, the Panamanian government decided not to maintain the
expense of a standing army and used the funds to develop education, in infrastructure, and
other public works).
223.
See id.
224.
See Verbatim Record (Revised) of the Ninth Plenary Meeting, supra note 215; see
also Survey of Proposals Made by Various Delegations During the General Discussion, supra
note 189, at 15.
225.
See Extracts from the Debates, supra note 218.
226.
See generally Survey of Proposals Made by Various Delegations During the General Discussion, supra note 189.
227.
Id.
228.
See id. at 31–32.
229.
See id.
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Ultimately, the adoption of the idea of moral disarmament at the Dis230
armament Conference was unsuccessful. Instead, it went into hibernation
due to the political realities after Germany decided to end its involvement
231
with the conference. In short, after the Second World War, states busied
themselves with rebuilding economies, and the principles of moral disarmament were forgotten. Nevertheless, the efforts made during the interwar period—especially during the Disarmament Conference—created important principles that are every bit as relevant today as they were then.
With the rise in global nationalism in the past few years and the general re232
treat of international human rights, the focus of moral disarmament on intellectual cooperation is particularly important. As moral disarmament proponents during the interwar period identified, “it is in the intellectual
domain that the forces of nationalism seem to be less opposed to the eventu233
al reaching of a harmonious understanding.” The paradigm of moral disarmament might help states eventually overcome that nationalism and work
toward harmonious understanding.
This Article does not describe a reality where a connection between education, intellectual collaboration, and channels of broadcasting already exists, let alone one that promotes the achievement of peaceful and harmonious relations between states, all in the context of broad disarmament.
Instead, this Article presents a normative argument for connecting all of
these elements together under the banner of moral disarmament, as the international community tried during the interwar period. States could achieve
meaningful disarmament by promoting/increasing international collaborations between the arts, sciences, humanities, and other faculties through education and teaching. Such collaborations could be enhanced further
through cooperation between intellectual circles, domestic penal legislation,
cinema, broadcasting, and the press. Such international cooperation could
lead to greater international and domestic stability and would in turn promote disarmament through society for society as a whole. Another effect of
increased international collaboration in various aspects of society would be
the intrinsic development of a society attuned to disarmament. The following Part explains the connection between development and disarmament in
230.
See Moral Disarmament: Correspondence with Dr. James T. Shotwell, supra note
145 (Dr. Shotwell believed that the importance of all the initiatives taken by the Committees
of Intellectual Co-operation and the American National Committee on International Intellectual Co-operation would depend on “the completion of a treaty by the Disarmament Conference[.]” Further, he noted that, if moral disarmament was ensconced within a Disarmament
treaty, it would “especially mean a justification of the C.I.C.” He also observed that, even
though material disarmament was being called for, moral disarmament might “prove ultimately to be as important as anything that the Treaty could contain[.]”).
231.
See F.P. WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 550 (1950) (discussing how Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference).
232.
See generally Ingrid Wuerth, International Law in the Post-Human Rights Era, 96
TEX. L. REV. 279 (2017).
233.
Moral Disarmament: Correspondence with Dr. James T. Shotwell, supra note 145.
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order for states to think about resurrecting, in contemporary society, the
principles of moral disarmament they eagerly supported during the interwar
period.

IV. Development and Disarmament
During the interwar period, states discussed the concept of moral disarmament and made several recommendations to achieve disarmament
through the intrinsic development of society. Although the idea of moral
disarmament did not succeed during the interwar period, it is suggested that
reviving the principles of moral disarmament can help contemporary societies walk the path of economic development and international cooperation.
This Part looks at the relationship between disarmament and development.
During times of war, states focus on building armaments, and development is not a focal point in terms of allocation of resources. An overview of
the consequences of war in denominations of facts and figures can only be,
at best, an over-simplification of the destruction and damage caused not only during the conflict but also to the environment and future generations of
humankind. These facts and figures, though woefully inadequate in providing a true estimate of destruction, nevertheless are valuable inasmuch as
they provide thought-provoking insights into the resources consumed during
these conflicts. A comparison of rough estimates of the cost of the First
World War to the cost of all wars in the world from 1793 to 1910 presents a
dramatic picture of the magnitude of that war. The cost of more than 100
years of wars ($23 billion) in different parts of the world pales in comparison to the cost of four years of continuous war ($186 billion) during the
234
First World War. Furthermore, a rough estimate of Germany’s reparation
burden for the First World War (for the next 40 years) was estimated as less
than the amount that the United States would spend in the next 40 years if it
continued at the same rate of armament as in the immediate aftermath of the
235
First World War.
The thought-provoking aspect of these estimates lies in the appropriation of funds among various demands on a state’s purse. As an example, examining the figures for the United States’ appropriations in 1920 shows that
an astonishing 93 percent of the demands on the state purse were devoted to
wars—past, present, and future—while the meager remains were divided
among the civil departments (3 percent), public works (3 percent), and a
236
paltry 1 percent to research, education, and health. Resources available to
a state are not a magician’s infinite pool of plenty, and, therefore, as one
demand on the purse increases, other demands are relegated to a lower position. War destroys more than just the lives of people on the battlefront. It
234.
See DISARMAMENT EDUCATION COMMITTEE, FACTS ON DISARMAMENT 3 (1921),
http://libraryresources.unog.ch/ld.php?content_id=19934100.
235.
See id. at 13.
236.
See id. at 5.
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also impacts the livelihood of millions of people and cuts off any hope of a
stable, industrious, and peaceful future. As states focus on arming and fortifying their military resources, they inevitably draw resources away from essential requirements of society. This results in a malnourished, underdeveloped society that is unable to ascend the pyramid of economic and social
development and consequently fails to resist baser desires to resolve conflicts through war and aggression.
Public opinion during the time of the 1932 Disarmament Conference
was strongly pushing for efforts to substantially reduce military expenditure
237
and to reduce armaments. The Disarmament Conference cautioned the
world that even a status quo relating to armaments at the levels in 1932 con238
stituted “a menace” to world peace. The opening remarks at the Disarmament Conference included a reminder to all governments that “the problem
of disarmament” was “vitally relevant to the grave economic and financial
239
crisis” most states were facing. It was acknowledged that the economic
and financial crisis that gripped the world in the interwar period was causal240
ly linked to “the financial burden of armaments and of past wars . . . .” In
addition, a large number of countries agreed that the financial burden of ar241
maments was a “principle cause of unbalanced budgets . . . .” The delegates at the conference confirmed that an average estimate of expenditure
toward military defense and armaments was in the range of an astonishing
242
“4,000 million dollars a year.”
At the Disarmament Conference, governments were cautioned that, in
view of the immense expenditure on military purposes, the increased allocations of national incomes were all to be the indirect burden of the taxpayer
and that such a burden would be at the cost of his or her development in so243
ciety. Therefore, it was proposed that definite progress in the direction of
general disarmament would, “at once, lighten the onerous financial burden
and bring a much-needed measure of relief to the world beset by grave eco244
nomic difficulties[.]” The discussions at the Disarmament Conference
thus indicate that the international community accepted the nexus between
disarmament and development.
In the period following the Second World War, states focused on rebuilding their economies. The international community continued to support
237.
See Verbatim Record (Revised) of the First Plenary Meeting, supra note 48, at 7
(noting how national and international organizations had requested for the opportunity of presenting petitions with regard to disarmament to the Disarmament Conference).
238.
Id.
239.
Id.
240.
Id.
241.
Id.
242.
Id. (noting that the estimate of “4,000 million dollars a year” was the cost for 61
states in the 4–5 years preceding the Disarmament Conference).
243.
See id.
244.
Id.
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the disarmament and development connection. The support is evident from
an examination of “proposals by a politically and geographically broad
245
spectrum of states since the early days of the United Nations.” The 1987
246
Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development
247
had three issues on its agenda before it started. The first issue was to consider the “[r]elationship between disarmament and development in all its as248
pects and dimensions[.]”
The second issue was to consider the
“[i]mplications of the level and magnitude of military expenditures, in particular those of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily important States,
for the world economy and the international economic and social situation,
particularly for the developing countries, and formulation of appropriate
249
recommendations for remedial measures[.]” The third issue was to consider “[w]ays and means of releasing additional resources, through disarmament measures, for development purposes, in particular for the benefit
250
of developing countries[.]”
Apart from States, non-governmental agencies and organizations also
supported the causal linkage between disarmament and the development of
society. Peaceful international cooperation, women’s rights and liberation,
stable economies, and social benefits were considered important to development and disarmament. Peace through disarmament was among the various causes championed by women’s organizations around the world during
the interwar period. The Disarmament Committee of the International
Women’s Organizations worked tirelessly to spread awareness of the principles of moral disarmament and its advantages for a stable and peaceful so251
ciety. An emphasis on social benefits, women’s liberation, and the development of society that provides welfare to its peoples have featured in the
agenda for peace through disarmament. The costs of war include farreaching effects on the lives of women, and such a consideration is “[o]ne of
252
the constitutive positions of antiwar feminism . . . .”

245.
International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, Final Document, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. E.87.IX.8 (Sept. 30, 1987); see also RIETIKER, supra
note 10, at 244–45.
246.
Pursuant to General Assembly Resolutions 39/160 and 40/155.
247.
See Final Document, supra note 245, at iii; Report of the International Conference
on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.130/39
(Aug. 24, 1987).
248.
Final Document, supra note 245, at iii.
249.
Id. at iii.
250.
Id.
251.
See Carol Cohn & Sara Ruddick, A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of
Mass Destruction, ETHICS AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 405, 417 (Sohail H.
Hashmi & Steven P. Lee eds., 2004).
252.
Id. at 417; see generally Naomi R. Cahn, Women in Post-Conflict Reconstruction:
Dilemmas and Directions, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 335 (2006).
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The difference in the economic and developmental conditions of states
253
cannot be ignored in a discussion regarding the social costs of war. The
situation only worsens in underdeveloped states where people still live in
abject poverty, as such states have many important demands and limited resources to fund them. In order to arrive at development levels that can provide citizens with stable economic and social developmental growth, states
need to expend resources on infrastructure, food, water, education, and other
254
essential services. Therefore, in a situation where an increase in arma255
ments is called for, “the social costs” of the call to arms are at a level that
256
is dangerous to society and its development. The problem certainly is not
restricted to developing states. For example, the United States, which is one
of the most developed countries in the world, has “an appreciable number of
people” who cannot afford healthcare, while its nuclear weapons program
257
costs a whopping “4.5 trillion dollars.”
Several states absolutely cannot afford to reduce the already threadbare
budgets available for social and economic development in order to use the
funds for expansion of their armory. However, in the face of uncertainty in
international relations, an international security crisis, an escalation of tensions between states, or the introduction of an arms race between neighboring states, it is inevitable that such funds will be reallocated to military expenditures. A recent example is Mozambique’s purchase of expensive
258
warships at the expense of necessary government services for its people.
In principle, resources that are needed for social welfare and the betterment
of the human race ought not to be squandered on an armaments race, whether the aim is defense through attack or deterrence. Even “the threat” of a rise
in armaments will disrupt the equilibrium between states and prevent a
259
“consolidation of peaceful and harmonious relationships . . . .” There can
be no discussion related to economic and social development when the
foundations of international cooperation and trust are uncertain. It is inevitable that budgetary difficulties caused by large allocations to armaments
will lead to economic and social issues and disorganized credit and will par-

253.
See Cohn & Ruddick, supra note 251, at 417.
254.
See id.
255.
B.W. Patch, World Disarmament Conference of 1932, CQ PRESS (1932), http://
library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre1932010500#H2 (noting that the
cost to the treasury of building an armed defense is “a tremendous deadweight of costs” constituting “a drain on the national resources of all nations which has not only helped to bring
about and to aggravate the present economic world crisis but is also actively impeding recovery[.]”).
256.
Cohn & Ruddick, supra note 251, at 417.
257.
Id. at 418; see also William P. Quigley, Revolutionary Lawyering: Addressing the
Root Causes of Poverty and Wealth, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 101, 138–42 (2006).
258.
See African Debt: Rearing Its Odious Head Once More, ECONOMIST, Mar. 10,
2018, at 18.
259.
Patch, supra note 255.
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260

alyze initiatives. Therefore, it can be said that, generally, the growth in the
261
number of armaments negatively impacts development.
A focus on the development of society using the principles of moral
disarmament might help foster peace and mutual trust in international relations. A society that promotes peace and solidarity in their international relations will resist the desire to go to war or resolve disputes through aggression. Therefore, more thought should be given to moral disarmament, and
more attention should be given to the connection between development and
disarmament. In short, the difference between “global military expenditures
and unmet socio-economic needs provides a compelling moral appeal” in
262
connecting development and disarmament. The nexus between disarma263
ment and development is not difficult to either establish or understand. It
is a directly proportional relationship. A society that seeks to develop to its
fullest potential must necessarily have the principles of peace, understanding, respect, and tolerance in connection with its international relations. A
society that revives the principles of moral disarmament in its day-to-day
affairs will also use similar principles in its foreign policies and accept
peaceful international relations as a norm. Such a society will have peace at
the foundation of its international relations and will be able to focus a major
portion of its resources on development.
Thus, a society that is attuned to principles of moral disarmament can
achieve permanent stability in its economic and social spheres of life. People who are nurtured in such stable environments and realize the advantages
of international solidarity will, as a corollary, be more amenable to walking
on the path of disarmament and harmony between states.

V. Moral Disarmament and Nuclear Weapons
It is said that we learn from history. Throughout the ages, war has been
an instrument to protect and preserve oneself and one’s own from foreign
marauders and rampages. However, the untold devastation wrought by two
world wars has taken its toll on the positive symbolism of war. The preamble of the United Nations Charter stands witness to this fact. The preamble
of the Charter also promotes “social progress and better standards of life in
260.
Verbatim Record (Revised) of the Ninth Plenary Meeting, supra note 215, at 105;
see also Survey of Proposals Made by Various Delegations During the General Discussion,
supra note 189, at 14.
261.
See Arbitration, Security and Reduction of Armaments: Extracts from the Debates
of the Fifth Assembly Including Those of the First and Third Committees, supra note 218, at
35–36 (providing an example by the delegation from Panama, that after the Treaty of HayBunau Varilla the government decided “to free the people from the burdens and dangers involved in the maintenance of a standing army[,]” with the “sums thus released from the public
treasury hav[ing] been employed in the development of education, in the construction of new
roads and in new public works.”).
262.
Final Document, supra note 245, at 2.
263.
See RIETIKER, supra note 10, at 244–45.
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larger freedom,” peace and tolerance in international relations, and directs
states to “employ international machinery for the promotion of the econom264
ic and social advancement of all peoples.” War no longer is considered a
lawful method of resolving disputes outside of self-defense, authorized collective action, and occasionally for humanitarian reasons. The need of international society is development, economic security, stability in international
relations, and an environment free from uncertainties of aggression and hostilities in order for it to reach its fullest potential. The issue of nuclear disarmament is one of the obstacles in the path to stability and peace in international relations. During the interwar period, states discussed means of using
principles of moral disarmament to achieve stability and peace in international relations and in the process walk the path of disarmament. During the
interwar period, there was no fear of nuclear weapons. Today, however, nuclear armaments are the most destructive weapons that are available to man.
Despite the destructive nature of nuclear weapons, and despite the fact
that the world in so many ways has yet to come to terms with the repercussions of the use of the atomic bomb, the issue of nuclear disarmament has
not made any significant progress, despite considerable international deliberations on the issue. Therefore, it is suggested that the principles of moral
disarmament be applied by states to achieve nuclear disarmament.
The question of disarmament has become even more significant and
sensitive in connection with nuclear weapons as compared to conventional
weapons. The disarmament discussions in the interwar period had negotiating parties that could, in theory, be considered to be on a level playing field,
discounting for financial capabilities. However, they all had weapons in
their military arsenals that they were seeking to limit. Furthermore, there
was a common intention that brought them all to the disarmament negotiating table. With respect to nuclear weapons, there is neither a level playing
field nor a common intention that can be ascribed to the discussions and negotiations relating to nuclear disarmament. In fact, it is not too much to state
that there is no common objective today driving all the states to deliberate at
the nuclear disarmament negotiating table. However, despite permanent
members of the UN Security Council paying lip service to general nuclear
265
disarmament, many other states are working toward making disarmament
266
a reality through the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
Nuclear-weapon states are occupied with the unease of a non-nuclearweapon state violating its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (the “NPT”). Non-nuclear-weapon states are worried about the lack
of progress in reduction by nuclear-weapons states of their nuclear-weapon
arsenals. It is no wonder, then, that no significant commitments have been
264.
See U.N. Charter pmbl.
265.
See S.C. Res. 1887, at 1 (Sept. 24, 2009).
266.
See generally U.N. Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf.229/2017/8 (July 7, 2017).
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made at any of the Review Conferences of the NPT toward nuclear disarmament, despite efforts to highlight the repercussions of the use of nuclear
weapons on human life. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan emphasized the consequences of “a nuclear catastrophe” in terms of human and
economic development to the delegates at the 2005 NPT Review Confer267
ence.
Since all other efforts seem to have reached a standoff, it may be useful
to pursue nuclear disarmament through the lens of moral disarmament. As
alluded to in the introduction of this Article, the Nobel Peace Prize of 2017
was awarded to an advocacy group that campaigns for the abolition of nuclear weapons. They push for nuclear disarmament based on the humanitarian principle from the IHL tradition, not from the broader human motive
that Passy alluded to in the introductory quote and as advocated for in this
Article. Both share the goal of nuclear disarmament. However, this Article
posits that the creation of a peaceful and stable society is needed before nuclear disarmament can be fully realized and that the humanitarian principle
from the IHL tradition is an insufficient basis to get us there.
Following the established procedure of the Disarmament Conference, a
first step toward implementing the notion of moral disarmament in the arena
of nuclear weapons is collaboration between societies of intellectual cooperation and international agencies to conduct preliminary deliberations on
the methods of attaining moral disarmament with respect to nuclear weapons. The recommendations of the Committee of Moral Disarmament of the
1932 Disarmament Conference could be reexamined and redrafted to include the current stages of development in society. Educational reform
would be one of the primary areas of focus. The avenues of cinema and
broadcasting would have to be examined carefully so as not to obstruct any
fundamental rights. The issue of the press would be as difficult—if not more
so—today as during the interwar period. Recommendations would have to
be made without hampering the freedom of the press. The sphere of international intellectual cooperation would be a great enabler for recommendations on moral disarmament in the work of nuclear disarmament.
The process will definitely not be an easy one. However, as all other
avenues seem to be failing with respect to nuclear disarmament, the path of
moral disarmament is one that ought to be considered for the gradual and
progressive attainment of a world free of nuclear weapons.
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VI. Conclusion
In the immediate aftermath of the First World War, a tiny seed of moral
disarmament was sown in the bleak, war-ravaged landscape of the surviving
civilizations. The tremendous suffering and destruction caused by that conflict awakened the remaining populace to the advantages of peace and solidarity in international relations. Mutual respect, tolerance, and an appreciation of people from different countries were qualities to be cultivated in
every sphere of public life. That being the case, the environment in the interwar period was extremely beneficial to the growth of the idea of moral
disarmament. Due to the tireless efforts of international organizations like
the International Organization on Intellectual Cooperation and other associations and organizations working toward peace and mutual respect in every aspect of society, deliberations were made about education, the press, the
cinema, international intellectual collaboration, and legislation, inter alia.
Recommendations were made in respect of every field that could be a carrier for embedding the principle of moral disarmament firmly into the minds
of people across the world in a manner that would last well into the future.
The unfortunate events that commenced in Europe, even as the Disarmament Conference was operative, may explain why little progress regarding moral disarmament was made after its introduction. Indeed, multiple factors—including Germany’s departure from the Disarmament
Conference in 1933, the lack of universal participation or even broadly representative participation in the Disarmament Conference, the arms race
leading up to and during the Second World War, and Goebbels war propaganda—meant that the system surrounding the principle of moral disarmament never even had the chance to be established. The arms race continued
following the Second World War, although the race was between different
states and with the additional nuclear element. Moreover, the end of the
Second World War saw the introduction of human rights and the establishment of institutions like the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”), which essentially took over the work of
the International Organization on Intellectual Cooperation in promoting
268
these rights in 1946, but now without the express connection to disarmament, as was needed in the past. Therefore, moral disarmament suffered a
premature death almost immediately after its birth.
This Article has posited that the legacy principle of moral disarmament
should be resurrected and applied to nuclear disarmament, especially since
human rights and IHL’s principle of humanity has so far failed to make sufficient progress. Moreover, it is difficult to see the Treaty on the Prohibition
of Nuclear Weapons as representing genuine progress with regard to nuclear
disarmament on account of the fact that none of the nuclear-weapons states
are on board. The recommendations made in the interwar period in connec-
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tion with moral disarmament are every bit as relevant to contemporary society and issues of nuclear proliferation. If there is any solution to the deadlock surrounding nuclear disarmament, it might be found by reexamining
the principles of moral disarmament and ensuring a method of implementation in various aspects of public service and civil life. Material and moral
disarmament have always been interdependent, and for any disarmament
strategy to be successful, it is of the utmost importance to have parallel developments in both fields. This holds true for nuclear disarmament as well.
As Pope John Paul II wrote in 1982, disarmament will not succeed in establishing peace unless it is accompanied by ethical improvements to various
269
aspects of society. This is the exact type of division between material and
moral components of disarmament that was addressed at the 1932 Disarmament Conference under the banner of “moral disarmament” and that
has been promoted in this Article.

269.
See McGrath, supra note 15, at 226–27 (citing Pope John Paul II,
The Necessary Strategy for Peace, ORIGINS, June 24, 1982, at 84–86).

